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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about Islamabad’s center.
Islamabad is a city built from scratch. It was the “dream” of Ayub Khan–
Pakistan’s gregarious and globe-trotting general-cum-president–and the 
product of its chief master planner, Constantinos Doxiadis–the gregarious 
and globe-trotting architect-cum-global development expert. Endowed with 
a propensity for large-scale planning, both operated with a hubris-laden 
confidence in developing rational solutions to urban and national dilemmas, 
technocratic strategies employed as a means to realize grand visions. In this 
way, Islamabad was conceived by both as part of something much larger–
Ayub’s symbol of a freshly unified nation, steeped in nationalist fervor and 
draped with the dreams of progress, development and national unity, and 
Doxiadis’s far-reaching vision of “Ecumenopolis”, a planetary-scale entity of 
the far-distant future.
Rationality and dreams form the structural and symbolic basis upon which 
Islamabad and its core were conceived and constructed; yet its envelopment 
in the dialectic of rationality and dreams, of practice and theory, has 
prevented Islamabad from developing its own cohesion independent of 
these larger visions. Functionally deficient and overly symbolic, what exists 
in Islamabad’s central area today is not realized dreams but what emerged in 
between them.
This thesis uncovers the story of how Islamabad’s central axis and its terminus–
the major buildings of Pakistan’s Capital Complex–came to be what they are 
today. This thesis is not solely concerned with the forensic or analytical, 
however. Nor does it look at Islamabad in a vacuum. Rather, I am interested 
in Islamabad as the contemporary capital of the nation-state of Pakistan–a 
state where the dream of an “Islamic Democracy” is still being sought after. 
It is the intention of this thesis to re-consider the physical manifestation of 
the national center of power and its environs and re-frame its monuments in 
a more complex light, acknowledging that the very question of the Pakistani 
“public” is entangled in that space.
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June 13, 2008. Lawyers FIGURE 1: 
Movement “Long March” arrives in 
Islamabad.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 13 2008, a group of well-dressed lawyers and their supporters 
staged a massive protest in Islamabad, Pakistan, in the foreground of the 
city’s national government buildings. Formalized in response to the 2007 
sacking of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Lawyers Movement 
represents an emerging group of civil society interests that have begun to 
challenge the government in Pakistan around broad issues of human rights, 
democracy and the “rule of law.”
The lawyers targeted their protest at the base of Islamabad’s Capital Complex, 
the collection of formal white concrete and marble modernist structures that 
comprise, and symbolize, Pakistan’s center of state power. The buildings sit 
as lonely monuments centered at the terminus of Islamabad’s major axial 
boulevard of Jinnah Avenue, which stretches for miles to the southwest. 
Pakistan’s government complex has been formally fenced off for years, only 
accessible by those under government employment or with privileged access 
to the halls of power. Its foreground, the host of many protests such as that 
staged by the Lawyers Movement, sits empty on most days, as the section of 
the street has been closed to traffic in a time of heightened security concerns, 
and its only structure, beyond a few police shelters, is a grandstand built 
for the express purpose of viewing annual national parades. Jinnah Avenue, 
straight as an arrow, with its wide traffic lanes and median of well-manicured 
grass, is lined with non-descript commercial towers and low-slung commer-
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Jinnah Avenue,   FIGURE 2: 
Figure Ground, 2009.
Axial view of The  FIGURE 3: 
Presidency, by author.
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cial, retail and institutional buildings set far back from the street such that 
they fade into the background of a nearly hypnotic linear progression.
This thesis begins with the question of how Islamabad’s central axis and 
government complex became what they are today, and it concludes with 
a provocation for how the area might change to accommodate a changing 
national landscape, acknowledging that the very question of the Pakistani 
“public” is entangled in that space.
Islamabad is a city built from scratch. It was the “dream” of Ayub Khan–
Pakistan’s gregarious and globe-trotting general-cum-president–and the 
product of its chief master planner, Constantinos Doxiadis–the gregarious 
and globe-trotting architect-cum-global development expert. Endowed with 
a propensity for large-scale planning, both operated with a hubris-laden con-
fidence in developing rational solutions to urban and national dilemmas, 
technocratic strategies employed as a means to realize grand visions. In this 
way, Islamabad was conceived by both as part of something much larger–
Ayub’s symbol of a freshly unified nation, steeped in nationalist fervor and 
draped with the dreams of progress, development and national unity, and 
Doxiadis’s far-reaching vision of “Ecumenopolis,” a planetary-scale entity of 
the far-distant future.
Rationality and dreams form the structural and symbolic basis upon which 
Islamabad and its core were conceived and constructed; yet its envelop-
ment in the dialectic of rationality and dreams, of practice and theory, has 
13
1 Ahmed-Zaib K. Mahsud, “Con-
stantinos A. Doxiadis’ Plan for Is-
lamabad: The Making of a ‘City 
of the Future’ 1959-1963.” (PhD 
Dissertation, Katholeike Univer-
siteit, Leuven Belgium, 2008), 
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prevented Islamabad from developing its own cohesion independent of 
these larger visions. Functionally deficient and overly symbolic, what exists 
in Islamabad’s central area today is not realized dreams but what emerged 
in between them–relatively banal urban form that is part-Dubai and part-
suburbia, with a hint of weak clichéd nationalist monumentalism.
Relatively little has been written about Islamabad. Recently, a renewed 
interest in the work of Constantinos Doxiadis has yielded scholarship on the 
city as his magnum opus, most recently in the work of Ahmed Zaib Khan 
Mahsud, whose lengthy work on the making of the city of Islamabad is a 
great resource on the city and its plan. Prior to his work, as Mahsud writes:
Islamabad [had] attracted the attention of a modest number of researchers 
resulting in the publication of one and a half book (Yakas 2001; Nilsson 
1973), two and a half PhDs (Siddiqi 1994; Spaulding 1994; and Hull 
2003), limited number of articles, the official discourse (Doxiadis, Ekistics, 
and the CDA pamphlets), and mention in a few books as footnote.1
Most of the scholarship on Islamabad, including Mahsud’s, focuses on the 
plan of Islamabad. My specific interests in writing this thesis are in the city-
as-built–the city as the Capital of the contemporary nation-state of Pakistan. 
The task of uncovering the story of the built and un-built proposals along 
the way from project to built entity occupies a significant portion of this 
work. Where the most deviation from Doxiadis’s master plan occurred was 
in the formation of its “Dynamic” center–Islamabad’s central axis–and its 
terminus in the monumental iconic buildings representing the national gov-
ernment. The story of these changes greatly reflects the national condition 
of a new nation-state struggling with its cohesion, rather than the work of 
determined visionaries sculpting Islamabad in their image.
Of specific relevance to the Capital Complex and central axis are the subjects 
of power and “national identity.” Two written works that relate this subject 
to Islamabad have been resources for this thesis–Lawrence Vale’s Architec-
ture, Power and National Identity and Imran Ahmed’s MIT Masters thesis, 
entitled The Journey from New Delhi to Islamabad. These works have yielded 
valuable insights on the city’s colonial legacy (Ahmed) and broad context of 
national power and built form (Vale). However, this thesis contends that a 
critique of Islamabad along these lines is more fruitful when it acknowledges 
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the complexity of the evolution of the plan as it changed from conception 
to reality. Not doing so runs the risk of conflating the acts of multiple actors 
in what was clearly a complex and multivalent effort to construct a city from 
scratch.
This thesis has two parts. Part One consists of three chapters that tell the 
story of how Islamabad’s central axis came to be what it is today, much of 
which–especially the development of the Capital Complex schemes–is not 
written about, and certainly not compiled in such a fashion. Chapter One 
focuses on the creation of Islamabad from the national point of view. This 
chapter analyzes the subject of Pakistan and its difficult attempt to sculpt an 
“Islamic Democracy,” an effort which–characterized by the polar opposition 
of secular and fundamentalist factions–still plagues the country in a serious 
way today. In this chapter I argue that by attempting to build the future of 
a country atop a legacy of past “greatness,” Pakistan has remained hovering 
in a perpetual and ambivalent present. This condition of “hovering above” is 
echoed in Islamabad as well. Chapter Two focuses on Constantinos Doxiadis 
and his conceptualization of Islamabad, which I argue was grounded more 
in a cosmopolitan utopian vision for the globe than that of a capital city for 
a new nation-state. Chapter Three deals with the evolution of the designs 
of Islamabad’s Capital Complex and central axis, which is the core area 
of study for the thesis. In this story, the themes of Islam, nationalism and 
power inevitably surface. Yet, in this chapter I argue that these issues must 
been seen within the context of how Islamabad’s Capital Complex and axis 
developed over time. In this chapter I argue that Doxiadis’s unique approach 
to conceptualizing the city’s center–a dual center juxtaposing city and state 
functions–was fundamentally different than the ideal set out by a govern-
ment seeking to unite a nation. I argue that, as a result, the expression of 
the city of Islamabad has not only been consumed by nationalist spectacle 
rather than developing an identity of its own, but that the absence of local 
expression has left banality at the core of the city.
Part Two focuses on the present condition, and culminates in a provoca-
tion for how Islamabad’s central area could be re-conceptualized. This re-
conceptualization is undertaken both in the interest of addressing functional 
problems with the city, which are largely the legacy of an over-determined 
rationalism, as well as addressing the broader and deeper issues that affect a 
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struggling nation, and thereby its capital city.
Islamabad is somewhere between project and city; the city has no elected 
municipal government, but is rather operated by the Capital Development 
Authority, the government body established in 1960 to produce the city 
from farm fields. Similarly, Pakistan is somewhere between idea and nation. 
The project of creating an “Islamic Democracy” continues today, as the very 
idea of it has been fought over since before Partition, and it continually re-
surfaces in unstable times. This thesis, in its concluding design provocations, 
suggests that resolving the project of Islamabad could go hand-in-glove with 
new beginnings for the nation of Pakistan.

PART I
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Chapter One
THE STATE (IN THE CITY)

East and West Pakistan FIGURE 4: 
in the 1960s. Sourced from Mo-
hammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not 
Masters.
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2 All of these are well referenced 
comparisons of Ayub. The “Solon” 
and “Lycurgus” references are 
from Samuel P. Huntington, Po-
litical Order in Changing Societ-
ies, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968), 251. The reference 
to “de Gaulle” is from George J. 
Lerski, “The Pakistan-American 
Alliance: A Reevaluation of the 
Past Decade,” in Asian Survey, 
Vol. 8, No. 5, 251. The moniker of 
the “Nation’s Principal Architect” 
is from Lawrence Ziring, “From 
Islamic Republic to Islamic State 
in Pakistan,” in Asian Survey Vol. 
24, No. 9, 935. All are as quoted 
in Mahsud, Dissertation, 95-96.
1. THE STATE (IN THE CITY)
Pakistan embarked on the project to build a new capital city in the late 
1950s, over a decade after the partitioning of British India in 1947. The new 
capital, it was imagined would lend physical form to a new government’s 
mission to unite what was then an ethnically heterogeneous and territorially 
non-contiguous nation-state, comprising of an East and West wing. The 
chief advocate of such a new capital was the general who became President, 
Mohammed Ayub Khan.
1.1 The Ayub Khan Era
Barely two years following the formation of Pakistan’s first constitution, 
that document was dissolved and the country began its long-lasting and 
uncomfortable experiment with authoritarian military rule. Mohammed 
Ayub Khan was without a doubt one of Pakistan’s most transformation-
al figures. A native of West Pakistan’s north, Ayub has been compared to 
Solon, Lycurgus, and DeGaulle, and described as the “Nation’s Principal 
Architect.”2 When Ayub took control in 1958, the country had progressed 
little since the trauma of Partition. Leaders had died or been assassinated, 
Ayub Khan. Clockwise: FIGURE 5: 
Portrait, Opening an Oil Refinery, 
Reviewing Islamabad, with Lyndon 
Johnson. Sourced from Mohammed 
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters.
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3 Ayub summarized the debate 
that he inherited in the follow-
ing way: “But more than anything 
else it was the irreconcilable 
nature of the forces of dogma-
tism and revivalism which was 
operating against the unification 
of the people. A sharp cleav-
age had been created between 
the State and the Religion, and 
all the old controversies – the 
temporal versus the spiritual, 
the secular versus the religious 
– revived.” He then argued that 
what was needed was an agree-
ment to build the foundation of 
the country within the common 
ground. From Mohammed Ayub 
Khan, Friends Not Masters, 
(London: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 195.
4 Ayub Khan was a pragma-
tist, and seemed to strive for a 
modern and progressive recon-
ciling of the state and religion. 
“The Constitution,” he wrote, 
“should provide a framework 
based on the experience and 
history of Islam and suited to the 
genius, temperament, and tra-
ditions of the people, but within 
that framework the community 
should be free to adopt principles 
derived from the Holy Qur’an and 
the Sunnah and evolve methods 
for the application of those prin-
ciples to its own circumstances.” 
From Mohammed Ayub Khan, 
198. When Ayub re-wrote the 
Constitution (largely on his own) 
in 1962, he removed the word 
“Islamic” and named the country 
the “Republic of Pakistan,” This 
was quickly modified by the first 
Constitutional Amendment in 
1963. From Ian Talbot, Pakistan: 
A Modern History, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998), 157-158.
5 Mahsud, Dissertation, 96.
the economy was quite stagnant, and the political landscape was unstable 
and shifting, principally due to the on-going dispute over the founding prin-
ciples of Pakistan’s “Islamic Democracy.”3 Ayub made it his task to re-invent 
and completely restructure the nation-state around his vision, and fashioned 
both his personality and government around this theme of re-invention. 
Ayub was generally secular in his approach,4 and his aim was moderniza-
tion and “progress” through economic development, by way of a techno-
cratic, rational approach to a massive task of reinvention. “He imagined,” 
as Mahsud describes, “a Pakistan of the future that would be progressive 
and modern, and believed that through rational (dispassionate) planning 
he could graft a structure that would assure this future for the nation.”5 
Islamabad was a significant part of this vision.
Indeed, significant economic growth did occur during his time in power, as 
did major projects for infrastructure and agricultural development, and the 
new capital city of Islamabad.6 These ultimately yielded his era the moniker 
of the “decade of progress.” While Ayub clearly aimed for his country’s im-
23
6 Pakistan’s new capital was 
formally named Islamabad, 
meaning “City of Islam,” by Paki-
stan’s Cabinet on February 24, 
1960. From Doxiadis Associates, 
Preliminary Program and Plan, 
(Athens: Doxiadis Associates, 
1960), 20.
7 Mohammed Ayub Khan, 188.
8 Doxiadis’s relationship with the 
Ford Foundation has been ex-
plored by several scholars re-
cently, including Mahsud, Muzaf-
far, and Pyla.
9 It is indeed difficult to disentangle 
the history of Pakistan from that 
of the United States. While Pak-
istan’s ties to the United States 
were strengthened in Ayub’s 
time, the two countries grew 
much closer in the 1980s when 
Pakistan served as a conduit for 
the U.S. in their support of anti-
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
For two different viewpoints on 
this issue, see Stephen Cohen, 
The Idea of Pakistan, (Washing-
ton D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004), and Tariq Ali, The 
Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path 
of American Power, (New York: 
Scribner, 2008).
 
10 Cohen, 3.
provement, he was preconditioned by his military background for a kind 
of benevolent authoritarianism, one reminiscent of the Mughals or the Raj, 
and his government reforms are characterized by a paternalistic elitism. In 
his memoirs, he wrote:
Our people are mostly uneducated and our politicians not so scrupulous. The 
people are capable of doing great things, but they can also be easily misled. 
Unfettered democracy can, therefore, prove dangerous, especially nowadays 
when communism from within and without is so quick to make use of its 
weakness. We, therefore, have to have a controlled form of democracy with 
checks and counter-checks.7
This is emblematic of Ayub’s simultaneous aims of “progress” and “modern-
ization,” and the centralization of power–a kind of “democracy from above.” 
Ayub is, in this way, a paradoxical and controversial figure–the man who 
transformed the condition of the state in a multitude of ways and took the 
reigns to guide the country through major reforms, was the same man whose 
politically expedient strategy forsook democratic processes in favor of other 
measures of progress. Ayub’s reference to the Cold War is not incidental, 
as he made the strategic decision to allow Pakistan to develop formal and 
informal ties with the United States. Formally building on a previous defense 
treaty, the armies of the two countries began to coordinate and collabo-
rate, and informal connections with U.S. non-governmental development 
and philanthropic organizations were fostered as well, most significantly in 
that of the Ford Foundation, which aided the government’s development of 
several infrastructure and housing development projects and facilitated the 
link to Constantinos Doxiadis, who worked on several projects in Pakistan 
in addition to the master plan for Islamabad.8
Overall, Ayub’s brand of rule planted the seeds for two lasting legacies–the 
strengthening of the army and its close connection to the country’s reins 
(two long-standing military regimes have followed Ayub’s), and strategic 
alliances with the West, specifically the United States.9 In describing Pakistan, 
American historian Stephen Cohen has noted:
For most of its history, Pakistan has oscillated between unstable democracy 
and benign authoritarianism.10
To say that Pakistan’s political history is one of a shifting between democracy 
24
11 The term “Military-Bureaucratic-
Oligarchy” is a widely-used term 
that appears in multiple history 
books as well as the popular 
press. Cohen uses the term “Es-
tablishment,” which he acknowl-
edges is not his original term. 
Cohen, 68.
12 The Western media often 
enjoys focusing on the ques-
tion of whether Pakistan is a 
“failed” state. For a critique of 
such a viewpoint, see Manam 
Ahmed, “Legends of the Fail,” 
in The National newspaper 
in the UAE: http://www.then-
ational.ae/article/20090508/
REVIEW/705079996/1008
 I am not speaking these terms, 
but rather positing that the 
strength of Pakistan as an idea 
may be stronger than its state in-
stitutions.
13 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, “Presi-
dential Address to the Constit-
uent Assembly of Pakistan at 
Karachi.” http://pakistanspace.
tripod.com/archives/47jin11.htm. 
(Accessed April 20, 2009).
and dictatorship is an oversimplification, and certainly many view authori-
tarianism in the country as something much worse than “benign.” Yet, his 
notion of “oscillation” certainly describes what is a discernable pattern over 
the course of Pakistan’s 60-year existence. Pakistan, the smaller of the two na-
tion-states carved from British India, struggled from the outset to determine 
its trajectory of governance, an effort that has continued into the present in 
a repeating pattern of realignment and reinvention as the country has shifted 
between democratically elected governments and military regimes. In its 
short history, Pakistan has written its constitution thrice and undergone 
multiple military and civilian coups, of which Ayub’s was the first, while 
struggling to define the nature of its “Islamic Democracy.” Political power 
has largely and increasingly been manifested in the hands of what has come 
to be called the “military-bureaucratic-oligarchy,” or simply “The Establish-
ment.”11 Comprised of the three remnant power centers from pre-Partition, 
as Cohen describes it, this informal elite establishment–although veiled 
by public disputes–has conspired to prevent the development of a stable 
system of governance and broad physical and institutional infrastructure in 
Pakistan. This phenomenon, along with the populist distractions of Kashmir 
and an amplified rivalry with India, are constant themes within Pakistan’s 
continued state of hovering oscillation. In many ways, Pakistan exists as 
more of an “idea” (one which has multiple conceptions), than as a well-
functioning nation-state.12
1.2 Pakistan: From Idea to State
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed–that has nothing to do with the 
business of the State… We are starting in the days when there is no discrimi-
nation, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimina-
tion between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this funda-
mental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.
–Mohammed Ali Jinnah, August 11, 1947 13
On the eve of Indian independence, Jawaharlal Nehru sketched the profile 
of a new nation-state of India, in his now most famous “Tryst with Destiny” 
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address. Nehru, remaining India’s leader until his death over 16 years later, 
solidified a commitment made to India’s modernization through industri-
alization and to secular, democratic governance. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s 
address to Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly–quoted above–just three 
days prior, is characterized by an equally progressive enthusiasm, yet Paki-
stan’s 60-year experience with nationhood has been markedly different from 
that of its next-door neighbor. Jinnah died barely a year after independence, 
and the country is still struggling to realize–or even define–the “Islamic 
Democracy” that the country’s founders aimed to shape a country around.
The idea of Pakistan began long before the creation of the nation-state 
of Pakistan in 1947.14 Muslims in South Asia had been advocating for 
spatial autonomy of some kind for over a century,15 but the contemporary 
notion of an autonomous Muslim territory on the subcontinent is rooted 
in a movement for Muslim representation within British India that later 
gathered momentum in the late 1930s as pleas for a distinct state were popu-
larized. The All-India Muslim League, the organization-cum-political party 
comprised of Muslim elites, professionals, and intellectuals that would come 
to lead the charge for an independent state, was originally formed (1906) as 
an effort to formalize solidarity among Muslims of British India. By 1930, 
the League was led by Mohammed Iqbal, the poet and social/political activist 
of the time who is widely credited as the first to articulate a future vision for 
what would become Pakistan.16 In an address to the League, Iqbal stated:
I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and 
Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the 
British Empire or without the British Empire, the formulation of a consoli-
dated north-west Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny 
of the Muslims of north-west India.17
Clearly leaving the door open on the subject of independence from Britain, 
Iqbal’s sentiments stressed autonomy and contiguity of territory–the “north-
west Indian Muslim state”–above the singular element of religious identi-
fication. Of notable exception, of course, is the State of Bengal, the high 
Muslim percentage of which would bring it into the Partition equation in 
the coming years.18 The partitioning of Bengal by the British had been a 
founding cause for the League, which makes Iqbal’s exclusion of it in the 
articulation of Muslim autonomy even more revealing. He later made his 
14 See Cohen, Chapters 1 and 2, 
for this “Idea-State” distinction.
15 Abbas Rashid, “Pakistan: The 
Ideological Dimension” in Islam, 
Politics and the State: The Pak-
istan Experience, Mohammed 
Asghar Khan, Ed. (London: 
Zed Books, 1985), 72, quoted 
in Imran Ahmed, “The Journey 
from New Delhi to Islamabad: 
Dependence and Subversion 
in the Ambivalent Expression of 
Nationhood.” (SMArchS Thesis, 
MIT, 1992), 90.
16 “Pakistan” was coined four years 
later in 1934 by Cambridge 
University student Choudhary 
Rahmat Ali, who published it in 
an independence pamphlet enti-
tled Now or Never. Also meaning 
“Land of the Pure” in Persian, 
PAKSTAN (in its original spelling) 
stood then for Punjab, Afghania, 
Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan. 
Ali also argued for a contiguous 
territory, with the exclusion of 
Bengal, as did Iqbal. The name 
“Pakistan,” as Cohen describes, 
“did not come into common use 
until 1945. Even in the 1940 
resolution of the Muslim League 
calling for a separate state for 
India’s Muslims did not mention 
it.” Cohen, 26.
17 Asad M. Zaidi, Evolution of 
Muslim Political Thought in India 
V. 1, 51, quoted in Imran Ahmed, 
90.
18 Bengal, which the British had 
partitioned, was kept so after 
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view on the necessity of territorial contiguity explicit. “The life of Islam as 
a cultural force in this country,” he wrote,  “very largely depends on its cen-
tralization in a specified territory.”19 Iqbal’s 1930 speech was a transitional 
episode in the League’s efforts–a hinge between an early phase of advocacy for 
Muslim representation within British or independent India, and an advocacy 
for an autonomous region for Muslims.
Jinnah did not come instantly to the League,20 but he joined in 1913 and 
quickly led the organization through the historic Lucknow Pact21 with the 
Congress Party, which marked the League’s shift toward the Independence 
Movement. Jinnah, the well-heeled British-trained lawyer from Bombay, 
quickly became the figurehead and spokesman for Muslims in the inde-
pendence movement. Now immortalized as Pakistan’s founding father, the 
Quaid-e-Azam (“Great Leader”), Jinnah was by all accounts a moderate 
Muslim who, although on passionate occasions prone to divisive religious 
rhetoric22, was undoubtedly committed by the time of independence to a 
democratic and secular Pakistan.23
Jinnah is the figure who, by default, escorted the transition from the Idea of 
Pakistan to the Nation-state of Pakistan, from a movement for civil rights and 
representation within a larger entity to a full-fledged separatist movement, 
and finally a nation-state. The paradoxical nature of this transition is reflected 
in how Jinnah is often described. One scholar writes:
He is the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity who ends up dividing India. 
He is the man of avowed secular habit who presides over the realization of a 
religious ideal. He is the advocate of Pakistan who leaves open to the end the 
possibility of a united India, indeed, shows interest in being its first prime 
minister.24
Quotes by pre-and post-Partition Jinnah, when taken singularly, are fodder 
for divisive and inclusive perspectives, respectively. When seen through the 
contextual lens of Partition, they reveal the paradoxical realities of shifting 
from freedom movement to nationhood, from a minority seeking acknowl-
edgement to a majority taking power. What was consistent and unwavering 
in Jinnah’s personality was his legal background. Trained in a commitment 
to the “rule of law,” Jinnah would have been more disposed to a Pakistan 
built upon a strong constitutional foundation, rather than dominated by 
Partition, with East Bengal going 
to Pakistan in the form of East 
Pakistan, and West Bengal going 
to India. East Pakistan, some 24 
years after Partition, left Pakistan 
to become Bangladesh in the so-
called “Second Partition.”
19 Asad M. Zaidi, Evolution of 
Muslim Political Thought in India 
V. 4, 67, quoted in Imran Ahmed, 
91.
20 Jinnah’s early opposition to 
membership in the League was 
an opposition to their initial po-
sition in support of the British in 
India. This reveals the complex 
nature of South Asian Muslim 
unity at the time. The League 
had been formed in the interest 
of representative rights for the 
subcontinent’s estimated 20-25% 
Muslim minority. Realizing their 
continued minority status within 
a post-British state led the early 
League to support the British 
Raj in an effort to win favor with 
them, which reveals the political 
entanglements of early efforts at 
Muslim unity. Jinnah ultimately 
joined the Muslim League after 
they revised that position, and, 
as Ziring has argued, he did so in 
the interest of promoting a more 
moderate position against a rise 
in extremism by both Hindus and 
Muslims. Lawrence Ziring, PAK-
ISTAN: At the Crosscurrent of 
History, (Oxford: Oneworld Pub-
lications, 2003), 4-5.
21 The Lucknow Pact was an 
agreement between the Muslim 
League and the Congress Party 
(which Jinnah had recently been 
a member of) to fight jointly 
for Indian Independence from 
Britain, with the understanding 
that an allowance for the repre-
sentation of India’s Muslims was 
important to that struggle. This 
was a major step for the Muslim 
League to support Indian Inde-
pendence, and Jinnah was in a 
unique position to facilitate the 
negotiation between the League 
and the Congress. Jinnah is thus 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, FIGURE 6: 
LIFE Magazine, May 1946. Margaret 
Bourke-White.
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described as the “Ambassador of 
Hindu-Muslim Unity,” a moniker 
which is often used in contrast to 
his latter arguments for Partition. 
See Ziring, 4-5.
22 On March 22, 1940, during 
the Lahore Conference of the 
Muslim League, Jinnah delivered 
a speech that argued that Hindu-
ism and Islam were “different and 
distinct social orders… [that] can 
ever evolve a common national-
ity.” This speech is often quoted 
as evoking a “divisive” side of 
Jinnah. The speech is widely 
quoted, including in Rubina 
Saigol, “Myths vs facts about 
fundamentalism, Part 1”, in The 
News, February 21, 2009: ”http://
www.thenews.com.pk/daily_
detail.asp?id=163789 (accessed 
May 20, 2009)
23 Any claim about the defini-
tive beliefs of Jinnah should be 
treated skeptically; the man kept 
no diaries, wrote no autobiog-
raphy and reportedly had few 
close friends. See Francis Rob-
inson, “The Jinnah Story” in M.A. 
Jinnah: Views and Reviews, 
(Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 91-92.
 Scholars agree that his person-
al habits were not that of a strict 
Muslim, but there is little consen-
sus on the subject of Jinnah’s 
“true” intentions for the State of 
Pakistan, specifically that of the 
relationship between religion 
and government. As Stephen 
Cohen describes, “secular” is 
often used pejoratively in Paki-
stan (as is “liberal”) to describe 
those not committed to an 
Islamic state. [See Cohen, 43.] 
In this work, I have taken Jin-
nah’s latter speeches – those 
delivered while as the leader of 
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Pakistan – as characteristic of 
his wishes for the country. These 
are decidedly more “secular” in 
outlook than earlier speeches 
made in the throws of Pakistan’s 
Independence movement, which 
stressed religious difference in 
the name of Partition.
 Jinnah’s push for an independent 
Pakistan did not come until the 
early 1940s, and scholars hold in 
contention the nature of his com-
mitment to the two-nation theory, 
even up to the year of Partition. 
Until the opening up of both 
British and Pakistani archives 
in the late 1970s, much of the 
scholarship on Jinnah focused 
on his public speeches and por-
trayed him within the Quaid-e-
Azam persona. Jalal’s The Sole 
Spokesman (1985) was the first 
biography of Jinnah to chal-
lenge the established narrative. 
She later describes the book as 
stressing the “uneasy fit between 
the claim of Muslim ‘nationhood’ 
and the uncertainties and in-
determinacies of politics in the 
late colonial era that led to the 
attainment of sovereign ‘state-
hood.’” [Ayesha Jalal, “Between 
Myth and History” in M.A. Jinnah: 
Views and Reviews, (Karachi: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 
120] It was widely labeled the 
“revisionist” history of Jinnah, 
and her thesis was over simpli-
fied by critics as arguing that 
“Pakistan” was used simply as a 
“bargaining chip” in negotiations 
with Congress and the British. 
She describes this reading as, 
in her own words, “a gross dis-
tortion of not only my argument 
but of actual history.” [Jalal, 
“Myth,” 120] Over time, her the-
sis–interpreted as she would like 
it or not–has gradually shifted 
into mainstream scholarship on 
Jinnah.
24 Robinson, 91.
25 Ali, 33.
26 Mohammed Ayub Khan, 
“Speech delivered at founda-
tion-laying ceremony in Islam-
religious ideology.
Jinnah’s role in partitioning British India was indeed critical. But, as Tariq 
Ali and others have noted, World War II had a role to play in enabling it as 
well. The “Quit India” movement, which Gandhi encouraged the Congress 
Party to launch, boycotted the war effort. The Muslim League, on the other 
hand, took the opportunity to win favor with the British by offering troops 
and cooperation with the war effort. To say that Pakistan was a “big thank 
you present for the Muslim League”25 is an overstatement, but the assistance 
that the League provided in the war certainly elevated their status in the eyes 
of the British. As Tariq Ali reminds us, the secular appearance of the leader-
ship and their attempt to create a modern Muslim state was offensive to, 
and opposed by, hard-line Islamist organizations. It could be argued (as Ali 
does) that the contemporary and long-standing dispute in Pakistan between 
supporters of Jinnah et al’s conception of “Pakistan as Muslim Nation” and 
those who support a more theocratic orientation–Pakistan as an Islamic 
State”–is rooted in this foundational conflict at the time of Partition.
Reviewing the well-recorded and theorized history of Indian Partition, or of 
its leadership, is not within the scope of this thesis; there is voluminous liter-
ature on the subject. What is relevant to the city of Islamabad and its center, 
however, is how a particular pair of subjects was framed while the nation 
was born–that of Muslim unity on the subcontinent, and how Islam would/
should influence the government of the state of Pakistan. These twin subjects 
emerge as implicit and explicit tropes within the project for Islamabad.
1.3 Islamabad as National Project
Islamabad, has been my dream always–and it is not a dream which is un-
realistic or unwanted… Let me tell you this, the capital of a country is the 
focus and the centre of the people’s ambitions and desires, and it is wrong to 
put them in an existing city. It must have a colour of its own and character 
of its own. And that character is the sum total of the aspirations, the life and 
the ambitions of the people of the whole of Pakistan.  –Ayub Khan26
Ayub Khan wasted no time in putting into place the mechanisms from 
which to create the new Pakistani capital city, establishing a special “Capital 
Commission” just months after taking power. The interim capital, the port 
Islamabad’s new site.FIGURE 7: 
29
abad,” quoted in Zahir-Ud Deen 
Khwaja, Memoirs of an Architect, 
(Karachi: Arch Press, 1998), 81.
27 Ayub wrote that Karachi had 
become “a centre of agitation-
al politics: politicians found that 
they could collect mobs with the 
help of industrialists and busi-
nessmen and bring all kinds of 
pressures to bear on the gov-
ernment... Constant contact with 
businessmen had a corrupting in-
fluence on government servants 
and many of them succumbed 
to temptation.” Mohammed Ayub 
Khan, 96.
28 Mohammed Ayub Khan, 97.
29 Lawrence Vale, Architecture, 
Power, and National Identity, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 53. 
Vale’s three frameworks refer to 
1) the relationship of sub-groups 
to the whole (subnational) 2) the 
influence of a designer’s “person-
al identity” on a nation’s expres-
sion and 3) the relationship of a 
nation to an external, Western 
audience.
30 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1965), 277.
city of Karachi, was burgeoning with refugees from the East, and was seen 
by Ayub as a political scrum complicated by business interests and ingrained 
social and business networks, unfit for the isolated bureaucracy that Ayub 
promoted.27 In his mind, Islamabad was about starting Pakistan anew:
My own thinking was that capitals are not built, nor do they exist, just for 
the sake of, shall we say, utility… the capital of a country has to encompass 
much bigger vistas, and provide light and direction to the efforts of the 
people. It must, therefore, be located in the best possible surroundings. With 
the two provinces of Pakistan separated as they are, there is greater need to 
bring the people to a common platform. The thing to do was to take them 
to a new place together. So it was not just the building of a city: it was an 
opportunity to unite the people of Pakistan, and to give them the right op-
portunity in which to produce the best results.28
Ayub felt, in other words, that the “neutral” territory of a brand new city 
would provide the means to unite the country. Ayub’s aims at unification 
places Islamabad squarely within the genre of other capital-building projects 
of its time–cities built in the name of unifying a new nation-state and of con-
structing a “national identity” through the cultural production of architec-
ture and urban design. On this subject of constructing a “national identity,” 
Lawrence Vale argues that the framework is three-fold, that “what is passed 
off as a quest for national identity is in reality a product of a search for sub-
national, personal, and supranational identity.”29 One can read all three of 
these in Pakistan’s project for Islamabad, and it is that of the “supranational” 
and “subnational” (that which might innately tie a diverse public together) 
that Pakistan has most struggled with, both in the capital-building project 
and more generally. Paul Ricoeur summarized the struggle to construct a 
“national identity” in paradoxical terms:
There is a paradox. How to become modern and to return to sources; how 
to revive an old dormant civilization and take part in universal civiliza-
tion.30
“Returning to sources” was implicit in the project to relocate Pakistan’s 
capital. Officially, Ayub’s Capital Commission was to advise the President 
on the matter of the best location for the Capital functions. Unofficially, 
this commission is widely considered to be a bureaucratic veil employed to 
conceal a largely pre-determined course. The Commission recommended 
“Islamabad on the Grand FIGURE 8: 
Trunk Road.” From Doxiadis Associ-
ates, The Spirit of Islamabad.  
(Red line and circle added by author)
30
31 Ayub considered the Islamabad 
project as improving on that 
Legacy, through the bringing of 
reliable water resources to the 
area through the use of hydrolog-
ic dams. Mohammed Ayub Khan, 
97.
32 Doxiadis had been appointed 
Chief Consultant to the Federal 
Capital Commission, so presum-
ably he would have had some 
influence over the decision. Yet, 
his position seems to have been 
more the role of a compiler of 
material from various govern-
ment bodies, rather than a deci-
sion-maker.
locating the capital far from Karachi, and immediately adjacent to the mili-
tary’s headquarters in Rawalpindi. This military component to the recom-
mendation is widely written of, but was downplayed at the time by the 
government and Ayub. Although, the remote site’s “supranational” strategic 
character is difficult to deny. The new site was located along the historic 
Grand Trunk Road, connecting (via the Khyber Pass, the entry point to the 
subcontinent used by the Mughals and others across history) the ancient 
capitals of Calcutta, Delhi, Lahore, Kabul and Tehran. The location, in its 
references to the Mughal legacy on the subcontinent, added a cultural le-
gitimacy to the city’s new location that resonated with Ayub’s leadership 
style of the benevolent authoritarian. Of additional “cultural capital” for the 
Islamabad site was Taxila, the historic location of the Buddhist Gandhara 
(and later Greek) civilization.31 It seems apparent that Doxiadis, consider-
ing the relocation decision to be a political one, remained largely on the 
sidelines, although ostensibly he had some influence over the decision.32 His 
contribution as a city planner and development expert did lend an authority 
to the argument for Karachi’s unsuitability, and his writings and reports 
embraced the cultural legacy that the site presented. Doxiadis’s complicity 
in the mining of a cultural legacy for Islamabad is apparent, but it would 
be difficult to trace its origins to him. Indeed, As Mahsud has argued, given 
that Doxiadis had been working with the Pakistan government for some 
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33 Mahsud, Dissertation, 183-184.
34 Cohen, 25.
35 Cohen, 24.
36 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Paki-
stan and Islamic Identity: The 
Search for Saladin, (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 43.
time, it is difficult to distinguish between the influences of the government 
and Doxiadis on the Capital project.33
In the case of India, the task of mining the “dormant civilization” of Ricoeur’s 
paradox came on the heels of an independence movement with wildly popu-
larized cultural imagery, and one that had the immediately recognizable name 
“India.” Certainly there was a very real struggle over the future trajectory of 
the country–Gandhi’s villages or Nehru’s modernist urbano-industrializa-
tion–but its experience was fairly typical for a post-colonial state. Pakistan, 
on the other hand, was a more unique case; compared to the typical “from 
scratch” project of post-colonial identity production, Pakistan’s was instant. 
Being the product of a secessionist project (and thereby required to differ-
entiate itself from India) burdened Pakistan with an extra layer of identity-
production, resulting in a country that has defined itself more by what it is 
not (India) than what it is.
1.4 Islam as Subnational Proxy
In the effort of constructing nationhood, Pakistan was heterogeneous in 
ethnic terms. Unity among Muslims in British India was not something to 
be taken for granted. As Cohen summarizes, “By the time of the Raj, India’s 
Muslims had become a politically and culturally mixed population. They 
had a dispossessed court, narrow elite, and large poor peasantry.”34 Given the 
large rural poor peasantry, Partition’s legacy of Hindu-Muslim strife, Cohen 
argues, likely stems more from issues of class and power than from religious 
difference.35 India’s Muslims were, culturally speaking, a diverse group spread 
across the subcontinent, largely in pocketed remnants of Mughal Princely 
states. Many might have likely identified more with their fellow Punjabis or 
Bengalis than with a Muslim from a thousand miles away. 
There is copious literature on the subject of the Muslim response to the 
decline and fall of Moghul rule in the subcontinent. Pakistani adminis-
trator and scholar Akbar S. Ahmed argues that Indian Muslims, with the 
breakup of the Mughal court, “lost their kingdom, their Mughal Empire, 
their emperor, their language, their culture, their capital of Delhi, and their 
sense of self.”36 Although this view might seem to be an overstatement, it 
was thought that all Muslims could identify with the Mughal Empire (and 
its greatness), and that its loss affected more than just the elite. (Thus, its 
32
37 Cohen, 25-26.
38 Cohen, 25.
39 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokes-
man, (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1985).
appearance as a trope of cultural legacy within efforts to build a national 
identity) The subject is certainly susceptible to a flavoring with nationalist 
ideology, and scholars disagree on many details of how post-Moghul Muslim 
identity was shaped. There is agreement, however, on the galvanic effect of 
one particular event–the uprising of 1857 that led to the British Crown 
installing the governance of the Raj in British India. With the arrival of 
Crown rule came not only the formal disassembly of Mughal rule, but also 
the British colonial propensity for categorizing and classifying their domain 
and subjects. A massive bureaucratic mechanism was deployed across the 
subcontinent in an effort to take record of the population and the territory, 
and the political anxiety of the Muslim elite following the end of Mughal 
rule coincided with these taxonomic efforts and the subsequent develop-
ment of “Muslim” as a category.37 The two later conspired informally and 
unwittingly in the build up to Partition.
Distinction between cultural, ethnic and religious groups was formalized 
and institutionalized by the colonial government in the late 19th Century, 
and politicized by the establishment of special electorate and quota systems 
across India.38 At the same time that religious difference was being formalized 
in this way, a growing sense that India was heading toward political indepen-
dence led to a jockeying for power within projected national scenarios. This 
emphasis on difference, arguably enabled if not encouraged by the colonial 
regime, developed into propositions around the notion of Muslims as distinct 
and subsequently into arguments for the unique status of minority Muslims 
in South Asia. The movement for Pakistan-as-nation-state is built on this 
notion of distinction, which was itself built atop a monolithic colonial con-
struction of religious identity.
Pakistan’s potential territorial composition was quite vague and shifting in 
the years leading up to Partition, a function of continuous negotiations at the 
“bargaining counter”39 by the Muslim League with the Raj and Congress, and 
an uncertainty in the likelihood of transitioning from the Idea of Pakistan 
to an actual state. The potential constitutional framework and governance 
structure was even less clear. The Constituent Assembly, meeting only three 
days prior to Partition, was host to a tremendous debate on the constitution 
and its “Islamic” content, with the two sides essentially comprising of the 
centrist/secular Muslim Leaguers like Jinnah on one side and on the other 
33
40 As Zafaryab Ahmed describes, 
“Sovereignty” is a key controver-
sy for those opposed to a Muslim 
nation-state on orthodox Muslim 
grounds. The argument, put forth 
most notably by Maulana Mau-
doodi–at the Objectives Reso-
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create laws (over a sovereign 
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More mainstream Muslim schol-
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pretation of the term “sovereign-
ty” as a purely legal construct. 
Zafaryab Ahmed, ”Madoodi’s 
Islamic State”, in Islam, Politics 
and the State: The Pakistan Ex-
perience, Mohammed Asghar 
Khan, Ed. (London: Zed Books, 
1985), 95-113.
41 Constituent Assembly, “Objec-
tives Resolution” in http://www.
pakistani.org/pakistan/consti-
tution/annex_objres.html, Ac-
cessed April 22, 2009.
42 Imran Ahmed, 10-11.
the Islamist figures who were arguing for the incorporation of Islamic Law 
in the constitution.40 Jinnah, by and large, won the debate, and the resultant 
agreement of the Constituent Assembly, the “Objectives Resolution,” was 
decidedly centrist and open to flexible interpretation. It contains a commit-
ment to social welfare and the “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, 
tolerance and social justice,”41 positioned within the rubric of Islam.
While Jinnah might have argued that the act of Muslims voluntarily forming 
a nation-state together would be solidarity enough for national cohesion, 
this could only go so far. Iqbal’s 1930 speech envisioned a homeland predi-
cated on a cultural cohesiveness above religion, one defined by a particu-
lar contiguous territory. In Iqbal’s scenario, Muslim unity would have been 
something to be fostered, not a monolithic pre-condition presumed to hold 
any cohesive strength. The question of whether Islam was, or is, a prereq-
uisite for state formation (which opens the door to Pakistan as an “Islamic 
State”) or an end-goal of it (i.e. a “Nation of Muslims,” characterized by a 
distancing of state and religion), still surfaces today.
Over time, Islam has gradually come to serve as a proxy for ethnic unity 
across the nation. As Imran Ahmed put it in his analysis of Islamabad, “in 
order to buttress the fallacy of a Pakistani nation state religion is... instru-
mentalized and made into a solution to the problem of ethnic heterogeneity. 
Religion which held the potential of being subversive to colonial legacies, 
has now in an instrumentalized form and precarious manner been made 
a parallel source of authority.”42 Thus, religious distinction not only has a 
colonial legacy, but also is transformed from a means of subversive rebellion 
to a form of domination. The twin themes of “progress” and resurrection 
implied in Ricoeur were both well served in the employment of the Mughal 
legacy in the project for Islamabad. It served as a mythical legacy from which 
to construct legitimacy, and had cultural form and imagery to reinforce that 
authority, as well as the legacy of capital creation and the idea of Muslim 
“greatness.” Chapter Three outlines how these issues surface in the effort to 
create Islamabad and its center.
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Chapter Two
THE CITY (AND THE STATE)
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on every continent and, as Mark 
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44 Definition of Ekistics, from http://
www.ekistics.org/ekistdef.htm, 
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2. THE CITY (AND THE STATE)
Out of all the factors that have influenced the city of Islamabad, it is Con-
stantinos Doxiadis and his rubric of Ekistics that had the most significant 
impact on the physical form of the city.
2.1 Doxiadis and the Global Practice of Ekistics
The prolific career of Constantinos Doxiadis began in the 1950s and 
involved architecture, engineering and planning projects across the globe, 
over a dozen published books, and a self-established journal and educational 
institute dedicated to his theories.43 His work involved a radical expansion 
of the field of architecture, and its marriage to the then-nascent field of in-
ternational development. Over his career Doxiadis developed Ekistics - The 
Science of Human Settlements, which aimed to bring together virtually every 
element of study which had an impact on the physical manifestation of the 
human condition–architecture, city planning, economics, social sciences, 
biology, anthropology, network theory, etc–under the umbrella of a single 
theoretical and scientific pan-discipline.
Doxiadis derived his neologism “Ekistics” from the Greek oikistiko, meaning 
“concerning the foundation of a house, a habitation, a city or colony; con-
tributing to the settling.”44 Ekistics was an attempt to scientifically study and 
understand all aspects of human settlements at all scales–from the human 
to the planetary. The product of an increasing influence of “Taylorist” tech-
nocratic rationalism on the fields of architecture and planning, its premise 
was that through scientific study, statistical analysis and rational planning–
through an understanding of how cities function, how people use space, and 
how development patterns evolve–the then-contemporary problems of the 
urban condition45 could be tamed and managed, and humans could develop 
better spaces, better towns, better cities and a better planet. As Mark Wigley 
has described, in other words, “…if the data could be controlled, cities could 
be controlled.”46
Peripheral to the avant-garde urbanists of CIAM (Congrès Internation-
al d’Architecture Moderne), yet more theoretically-oriented than many 
post-war international development planners, Doxiadis and Ekistics occupy 
Constantinos Doxiadis. FIGURE 9: 
Clockwise from top left: Working on 
the Islamabad model in Athens, Trav-
elling through Beirut, and Teaching.
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bridge: MIT Press, 2000).
a unique, hybrid position in architecture and planning history. In the 1950s 
and 60s, architecture and urbanism were in transition. Suburbanization in 
the United States was deurbanizing and expanding cities, while projects at-
tempting to deploy modernist urban principles were beginning to be imple-
mented. CIAM, then the de facto authority on architectural modernism, was 
in the process of breaking apart; its 1933 Athens Charter, which had formed 
the basis for the Modernist conception of the city was being challenged, and 
in 1953 the organization famously splintered with the formation of Team 
X in a dispute over what had been the core tenants of that charter.47 Shortly 
afterwards, the Urban Design program was established at the Harvard Uni-
39
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versity Graduate School of Design, principally by Josep Lluis Sert, who was 
one who had been advocating within CIAM for a reinvestment in the core 
of cities, with the argument that cities were directly linked to modern liberal 
democratic thinking, and should thus be committed to and invested in.48
Occurring at the same time was an almost wholesale backlash against 
Modernism, and specifically its preeminent symbol–the Modernist city. 
Jane Jacobs’s famous The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), 
lambasted Modernist urbanism (or at least as it had been represented in 
the United States)49, and provocations like Bernard Rudofsky’s “Architecture 
without Architects” exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art in New York 
(1964) challenged the very purpose of the architectural discipline, its root-
edness in Europe, and its aesthetic. “City Planning” would soon shift away 
from physical planning and the top-down approach that had characterized 
it (which had the unfortunate association with large modern post-WWII 
redevelopment projects, such as “Urban Renewal” in the United States.) The 
image of the city planner sitting behind a large desk directing a government 
bureaucracy in the laying out of city form shifted rather rapidly to that of the 
“advocacy planner,” the character who works on behalf of the community 
to “empower” them to realize their vision of their city.50 It was a dramatic 
and multivalent transition, and Doxiadis–the quintessential polymath, the 
architect-cum-planner–found himself squarely in the middle of it.
CIAM’s interest in the city and its core urban functions escalated as many 
of its members became involved in the reconstruction of European cities 
following World War II. CIAM was not solely focused on Europe, however, 
as its members soon became involved in urban development and housing 
projects in Latin America, Africa and Asia, including the infamous capital 
building projects of Brasilia and Chandigarh. This international manifesta-
tion of CIAM’s oeuvre is how the story of modernist architecture in the 
“Third World” has largely been told, that Modernist architects injected the 
“developing” world with a small collection of projects and that, following 
that, the modernist aesthetic remained even in the absence of any social 
transformation. Yet, as Ijlal Muzaffar has written, other architects and 
urbanists who were peripheral to CIAM and sympathetic to Modernism’s 
latent social mission, yet aware of broader components to urbanization, such 
as economics, social sciences, etc, began to hybridize and become increas-
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51 Other key figures besides Doxi-
adis that Muzaffar identifies 
include Charles Abrams, Otto 
Koenigsberger, Maxwell Fry and 
Jane Drew. Ijlal Muzaffar, “The 
Periphery Within: Modern Archi-
tecture and the Making of the 
Third World”, (PhD Dissertation, 
MIT, 2007).
52 “Developmentalism” is a school 
of thought that emerged imme-
diately following World War II. 
Characterized by the establish-
ment of international political 
agreements and a global finan-
cial infrastructure established 
under the Bretton Woods agree-
ment, the “developmentalist” per-
spective was that the best way to 
increase in prosperity of nations 
was through economic develop-
ment. See Arturo Escobar, En-
countering Development: The 
Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World, (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1995).
53 Doxiadis was a prolific “neologi-
cian”. His new lexicon presum-
ably lent an academic feeling to 
his writing for some, but for those 
closer to the practice of urban 
design they were symbolic of his 
peripheral position. As Pyla has 
described, “The ‘Glossary’ was 
to become indispensable to each 
one of Doxiadis’s books.” Pyla, 
Panayiota I. “Ekistics, Architec-
ture and Environmental Politics, 
1945-1976: A Prehistory of Sus-
tainable Development”, (PhD 
Dissertation, MIT, 2002), 75.
54 Constantinos A. Doxiadis, Eki-
stics: An Introduction to the 
Science of Human Settlements, 
(New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 50.
ingly involved in global development.51 It is in this “developmentalist”52 
context that Doxiadis’s career was launched, and his “Science” of Ekistics 
was formed as the manifestation of a campaign to diversify and broaden 
architecture, as well as organize and compile a new collaborative and multi-
faceted approach to global development.
2.2 Ekistics and Islamabad
Islamabad was Doxiadis’s largest project and, being his masterwork, it is 
straight from the Ekistics playbook. In looking at Doxiadis’s work, two 
themes rise to the surface, both of which are embedded in Islamabad: A 
propensity for categorization and classification, and an apparent obsession 
with time, and growth of cities over time. 
Doxiadis’s approach to understanding “Human Settlements” was to relent-
lessly classify and categorize. He conceived of human existence as being 
comprised of five “elements”, some with their own neologisms53: Nature, 
Anthropos (human beings), Society, Shells (i.e. structures), and Networks. 
Central to the “science” was the Ekistics Logarithmic Scale (ELS), which 
classified human settlements from the scale of the human to that of the 
entire planet. While technocratic in its approach, the purpose of articulating 
the ELS and the five elements was not in the interest of simplification or 
automation of the design process; it was not about distinguishing between 
scales, but of highlighting their inter-connectedness. The ELS served to il-
lustrate Doxiadis’s contention that design should consider all scales, and all 
Ekistics elements, at once–especially as the domain of the architect and 
planner grew (to that of the “Ekistician”) to include projects of extraordinary 
size. “Nature” could not be distinguished from “Man,” and neither should 
the “dwelling” and the “town;” they were all components in relation to one 
whole–a massive, global system of humanity’s footprint on the planet that, 
he argued, should be considered holistically rather than as distinct, indi-
vidual components. On the subject of interdisciplinarity, Doxiadis wrote, 
“In our endeavor to study Ekistics we must remember that even though we 
have to study and learn many things, our main obligation is to study the 
gaps between elements and between disciplines; here is where the weakness 
lies. If we fill the gaps, the whole system will operate as one complex entity in 
a synergetic way.”54 The classification and categorization of Ekistics was not 
The Five Ekistics Ele-FIGURE 10: 
ments: Nature, Man (also called “An-
thropos”), Society, Shells (buildings), 
and Networks. Sourced from Kyrtsis.
The Ekistics Logarithmic FIGURE 11: 
Scale (ELS). Sourced from Doxiadis, 
EKISTICS.
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unique or new; the ELS can be seen as taking to an extreme both the CIAM 
grid, as Mark Wigley has argued, and the scales developed by the MARS 
Group in the study of city Cores.55 Nevertheless, Ekistics took holistic 
thinking and categorization well beyond anything that had come before, 
and for this reason scholars have argued that Ekistics, with its emphasis on 
holistic “balance”, represents a precursor to the contemporary notion of sus-
tainability, albeit within a scientific framework.56
55 For Wigley’s comparison to the 
CIAM grid, see Wigley, 93. For 
reference on the MARS Group 
scales presented at CIAM 8, see 
Mumford, p203.
56 Pyla. 149-154.
Islamabad Master Plan, FIGURE 12: 
1960. From Doxiadis Associates, 
Summary of final programme and 
plan. No. 37, (DOX-PA 93), Sept. 
1960, Appendices. Sourced from 
Mahsud, Dissertation Book II, 10.
Aerial photo of Islam-FIGURE 13: 
abad. Captured from Google Earth 
on January 19, 2009. 
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Islamabad was sited adjacent to the existing city of Rawalpindi, a former 
colonial cantonment on the Pothwar Plateau in Pakistan’s north, a fertile 
landscape of undulating terrain criss-crossed by small creeks at the base of 
the Margalla Hills, the Himalayan foothills. The most legible element in 
the city–both in the Master Plan and the contemporary satellite image–is 
the city’s mega-sized grid. Laid down across the undulating landscape of the 
plateau are major roads at an even spacing, which divide the city into equally 
mega-sized square sectors of 2,000 yards on each side.
Sector Plan for G7. FIGURE 14: 
Sectors were designed as the domain 
of the human, with minimum penetra-
tion by vehicles. Sourced rom Kyrtsis 
and Google Earth, composed by 
author.
“Structure of Communi-FIGURE 15: 
ties,” a sketch showing how the ELS 
hierarchy was put into place. Sourced 
from Kyrtsis.
43
57 Doxiadis supported the mixing 
of income groups, but not an a 
very fine-grain, and his official 
reports for Islamabad include the 
assumption that civil servants 
would relocate from building to 
building and from neighborhood 
to neighborhood as they grew in 
rank and income. This is likely 
more the result of government in-
fluence than that of Doxiadis. For 
a study of Islamabad’s incomes 
(now dated) see Rabia Specht, 
Islamabad, Rawalpindi: Region-
al and Urban Planning, (Copen-
hagen: School of Architecture, 
1983).
Doxiadis’s sectors were designed as “Communities Class V,” which matched 
“scale-level 8” within Doxiadis’s ELS–that of the “town.” Each was divided 
into four “Communities Class IV”, and each of those into “Communi-
ties Class III” and those into “Communities Class II.” The hyper-rational 
prescription applied to the nesting of “communities” was extended to the 
population as well, where the civil servants were projected to live in housing 
designed to their needs, with areas reserved for particular income groups.57 
“COMMUNITY CLASS V”
ELS SCALE LEVEL 08
(SECTOR)
“COMMUNITY CLASS IV”
ELS SCALE LEVEL 07
“COMMUNITY CLASS III”
ELS SCALE LEVEL 06
Nesting of “Communi-FIGURE 16: 
ties” in Islamabad’s sectors. Sourced 
from Kyrtsis, composed by author.
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“The Structure of a FIGURE 17: 
Community.” Sourced from Doxiadis, 
On Architecture in Islamabad, 177.
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58 Clarence Perry conceptualized 
the “Neighborhood Unit” in the 
1920s, and the English New 
Towns followed World War II 
(close contemporaries to Doxi-
adis’s career).
59 Doxiadis conceptualized these 
wide rights of way as “utilidors”, 
and projected that they would 
come to be host to not only ex-
tremely high-speed vehicular 
travel, but trunk lines for utility in-
frastructure and future, unknown 
modes of travel as well.
Doxiadis envisioned a city of individual self-contained sectors that, much 
like his descriptions of his childhood in Athens, consisted of a rather tightly 
knit, largely pedestrian-oriented built environment arranged around public 
open spaces and community functions. Each sector as a whole was to have 
a center (known as a “Markaz,” in Urdu) for community facilities at the 
sector scale, and smaller “centers” would be implemented at each of the 
smaller scales. Doxiadis’s sectors were echoes of both English New Town 
functionalism and earlier conceptions of the “Neighborhood Unit,” taken to 
an unprecedented scale.58 Two things were arguably unique about Doxiadis’s 
sectors; they were definitely mixed-use (and thereby a rejection of CIAM’s 
Functionalist City) and their internalization and introversion was amplified 
in their isolation by the grid. 
Although Doxiadis’s intention to integrate between scales was feasible within 
the sectors, the grid hinders the connectivity between sectors. Doxiadis 
conceived of the grid as the domain of fast-moving automobiles on divided 
highways within greenbelts,59 and of sectors as the domain of the human–
internalized, with a highly pedestrian environment, and minimal penetra-
tion by vehicles.
Segregation of Vehicles FIGURE 18: 
and Humans. Sourced from Doxiadis, 
Architecture in Transition. The origi-
nal caption reads: “The car enters the 
picture and changes the scale of di-
mensions which was previously con-
trolled only by man.”
The Fourth Dimension. FIGURE 19: 
Sourced from Doxiadis, Prelimi-
nary Program and Plan. The original 
caption reads: “The old city was three-
dimensional. The new has acquired a 
fourth dimension, time, whose role is 
often more important than that of the 
other three.” 
Unidirectional Growth. FIGURE 20: 
“Dynapolis” was typically portrayed 
in opposition to concentric growth. 
Sourced from Kyrtsis.
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60 Doxiadis Associates, “Islam-
abad: The Scale of the City and 
its Central Area”, in EKISTICS 
October 1962, 153, as quoted in 
Imran Ahmed, 101.
61 Doxiadis Associates, Preliminary 
Program and Plan (DOX-PA 77), 
(Athens: Doxiadis Associates, 
May 11, 1960), 114-116. See 
also Doxiadis, Constantinos A, 
Architecture in Transition, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 65.
In Doxiadis’s own words:
The open places between Sector Class V, should be very wide to allow for 
all future needs. Within them certain strips will be used immediately. The 
remaining part should be enclosed within fences or, if this is not practicable, 
at least enclosed by planting.60
Doxiadis’s motivation of segregating between humans and vehicles is under-
standable given his time period, and his particular preoccupation with the 
detrimental impacts of vehicles on cities. Yet, it has a lasting impact on the 
functioning of the city.
Doxiadis and Ekistics are also marked by a preoccupation with time, which 
he described as the fourth dimension. “Even more revolutionary than the 
conquest of the third dimension in the development of our cities is the 
advent of the fourth,” he wrote, “The cities of the past were static...In the 
modern city the fourth dimension, the dynamic growth through time, is 
the dominant feature.”61 Time, and the related theme of growth over time, 
is reflected most vividly in his two major concepts of Dynapolis–the “Ideal 
City of the Future”–and Ecumenopolis–“The Inevitable City of the Future.” 
Dynapolis was the vaguely reasoned response to what he argued was an 
“explosive” growth in cities, and it reflected Doxiadis’s belief that a city and 
“Double-Dynapolis” of FIGURE 21: 
Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Sourced 
from Doxiadis, Preliminary Program 
and Plan.
Islamabad’s “Dynamic” FIGURE 22: 
Center. Author’s overlay over original 
Master Plan.
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62 Dynapolis was a reflection of 
Doxiadis’s belief that his era 
was one of a fundamental tran-
sition from a “static” condition to 
a “dynamic” one; thus the term 
Dynapolis. The basis for his 
“dynamic” condition was essen-
tially two-fold–one being the influ-
ence of the automobile on cities, 
and the other being the consid-
erable population growth at the 
time. The Four Principles to Dy-
napolis, as described by Doxaid-
is, were “1. The Unity of Purpose, 
2. Hierarchy of Functions, 3. The 
Four Dimensions, and 4. Many 
Masters and Many Scales.” See 
Doxiadis Associates, Preliminary 
Program and Plan (DOX-PA 77), 
134-137.
its center needed to grow, and that they needed to grow in a rational way 
to accommodate what he saw as a massively changing urban environment 
growing at incredible speed through population growth and rural-urban 
migration.62 New city center growth would be achieved not by green belt 
land-banking, vertical expansion, or through poly-nuclear development of 
additional sub-centers, but through uni-directional expansion. Doxiadis’s 
Dynapolis was integrated into plans at every possible opportunity–from 
Detroit to Athens to Islamabad–and it appeared on planning documents 
as a ubiquitous lightning-bolt like stripe. Doxiadis’s plan for Islamabad was 
predicated on this concept of Dynapolis. The intention was for Islamabad 
to grow, over time, to the southwest, with its “Central Area” growing and 
expanding along “Capital Avenue,” now Jinnah Avenue. In fact, Islamabad 
was meant to grow in tandem with the existing city of Rawalpindi, as a 
“double-dynapolis.” (See Figure 21) The fallacy of such an idea as uni-direc-
tional growth is plainly evidenced by the master plan’s depiction of the city 
simply stopping at a pre-determined point, as though it hit an invisible wall. 
(See Figure 12) Although Islamabad has largely stuck to its assigned course 
of growing to the southwest, the pace of the city’s growth is nowhere near 
that forecasted by Doxiadis, and its residential sectors remain highly isolated 
from one another.
Doxiadis at work in FIGURE 23: 
Greece during the Marshall Plan. 
Sourced from Kyrtsis.
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63 See Escobar and Muzaffar for in-
formation on architectural mod-
ernism and “developmentalism.” 
For specific reference to the per-
sonal connections from recon-
struction to developmentalism, 
see Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis, 
ed. Constantinos A. Doxiadis: 
Texts, Design Drawings, Settle-
ments, (Athens: Ikaros, 2006), 
359.
64 Mahsud, Dissertation, 130-138. 
The “City of the Future” project 
was Doxiadis’s self-generated 
term for a life-long project to 
study, speculate on, and design 
for the ‘CIty of the Future.” This 
project received significant 
funding from the Ford Founda-
tion.
2.3 Global Thinking: Ekistics and Cosmopolitanism
Doxiadis’s early career is steeped in the cosmopolitan fervor of post-war re-
construction, the founding of trans-national organizations and governance 
structures, and the beginnings of the “developmentalist” project, all of 
which saw economic and national development across the globe as critical 
to the formation of a global peace. Doxiadis had served as a representa-
tive of Greece at the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and later as 
director of the Marshall Plan in Greece and Turkey, and these early days of 
reconstruction and large-scale redevelopment would permanently color his 
instantly-global career, as well as help him to launch that career, since the 
connections he established then–specifically with the future leaders of the 
Ford Foundation–would be crucial as he followed the “developmentalist” 
project as it spread from Europe to the “Third World” in the 1950s.63
The Islamabad project is enwrapped in what Mahsud has termed a “nexus” 
amongst the Ford Foundation, the Harvard Advisory Group, Doxiadis, and 
Ayub’s government.64 All four entities–the first a funding agency, the second 
a “think-tank”, the third a development planner, and the fourth a powerful 
government–were interested in and committed to putting large-scale mod-
ernization projects into place. It is within this “nexus” that Doxiadis was 
able to launch his “City of the Future” project, which Islamabad was inevi-
tably a part of; and it was how many other development projects–all within 
the “developmentalist” mode of progress through economic and industrial 
development–came about in Pakistan.
“Possible Structure of FIGURE 24: 
Ecumenopolis with 20 Billion Inhab-
itants, 2100.” Sourced from Doxiadis 
et al, Ecumenopolis.
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65 C.A. Doxiadis and J.G. Papa-
ioannou, Ecumenopolis: The 
Inevitable City of the Future. 
(New York: Norton, 1974), 436. 
The word “Anthropos” is Doxi-
adis’s gender-neutral term for 
mankind.
66 Doxiadis even incorporated Meg-
alopolis into his ELS, as scale 12 
of 15.
67 This is the subtitle of the book 
“Ecumenopolis”, and it speaks 
to his willingness to accept the 
trends in development, while 
pushing for an alternative.
It is in this globalized context that Doxiadis’s most enduring legacy of Ecu-
menopolis is situated. Doxiadis defined Ecumenopolis as:
The coming city that will, together with the corresponding open land which 
is indispensable for Anthropos [humans], cover the entire earth as a continu-
ous system forming a universal settlement. It is derived from the Greek words 
ecumene, that is, the total inhabitable area of the world, and polis, or city, 
in the broadest sense of the word.65
Ecumenopolis was the largest unit of Doxiadis’s ELS, and a neologism for 
the planetary-scale urban conglomeration that Doxiadis envisioned would 
emerge some 150-250 years in the future to stretch across all continents, 
supporting a theoretical maximum global capacity of 22-30 billion people. 
It was the logical extension of Jean Gottman’s analysis of Megalopolis in the 
northeast United States, where cities had begun to converge into one con-
tinuous urbanized “corridor.”66 Ecumenopolis was both a warning of the 
coming crisis of urban growth (should it remain uncontrolled on a global 
scale) and a call to arms, a plea for his own rational approach to creating a 
better version of the “Inevitable City of the Future.”67 It is exemplary of Eki-
stics’s framework of rational planning based on statistical data and projects, 
onto which Doxiadis always applied an implicit social and environmental 
agenda. The premise of Ecumenopolis as a city of the total inhabited world 
was (especially in its quasi-theological etymology, a short step from ecumeni-
cal and ecumenism) to prevent disorder and to prepare for a world where 
mankind could return to living harmoniously with each other and with the 
“International Radia-FIGURE 25: 
tion”, Doxiadis’s gesture toward bal-
ancing the local and international. 
Sourced from Doxiadis, On Architec-
ture in Islamabad.
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68 Doxiadis always framed his work 
within the “crisis” facing cities. 
From this crisis, he hoped to “lead 
humans back to the harmony 
they badly need,” an implicit ref-
erence to the traditional Athens 
of his youth. Constantinos A. 
Doxiadis, Building Entopia, (New 
York: Norton, 1975), 308.
69 Constantinos Doxiadis, “Need of 
Entopia”, in Constantinos A. Dox-
iadis: Texts, Design Drawings, 
Settlements, edited by Alexan-
dros-Andreas Kyrtsis, (Athens: 
Ikaros, 2006), 294-5.
70`The issue of the Ekistics Journal 
that celebrated Doxiadis after his 
death featured this phrase on 
the front cover. See EKISTICS 
Vol. 41, No. 247, June 1975. See 
also Pyla, 221.
71 Doxiadis, Architecture in Transi-
tion, 31.
72 I am paraphrasing Doxiadis here, 
although his terminology was 
very similar. See Doxiadis, Archi-
tecture in Transition, 31-33.
73 Pyla, 81.
natural world.68 Ecumenopolis, it can be argued, was largely built upon a 
cosmopolitan worldview. Doxiadis once wrote:
Now the time is riper for cosmopolis than ever before… But cosmopolis sets 
only the conceptual frame; the real subject we have to face is the universal 
city in its true sense. Its realization is Entopia. In this way, we can now 
foresee when cosmopolis, the dream of a unified world, can be reached.69
“Entopia” was something that Doxiadis began to articulate late in his career. 
It was what he projected as the end condition created by the project for Ecu-
menopolis, which he described as “between Utopia and Dystopia.” Entopia 
was conceived of as a kind of “attainable ideal,”70 emblematic of Doxiadis’s 
hybrid career, one that was somewhere between practice and theory, his 
proposals somewhere between rationality and dreams. A similar tension 
related to Ecumenopolis is that of Doxiadis’s affiliation for the local/regional 
(polis), and his subscription to the universal ideals (cosmos), values and 
principles espoused by his transnational context and implied in his project 
for Ecumenopolis. Doxiadis always presented a rather binary conception 
of the interface of the international and the local, and in his first published 
book, Architecture in Transition, he described this tension, and his career 
motivations, in explicitly architectural terms:
Architecture… moves between the local and the international, and archi-
tects are permanently caught between these two competing forces. Interna-
tional co-operation on matters of development is a very recent phenomenon, 
and experience in this field is limited. We are all still at the experimental 
stage of this new attempt to foster a better understanding among people and 
create a better world.71
His text goes on to describe the root causes of what he saw as components of 
a troublesome trend toward “similarity”–mechanical transportation, global 
trade, and the dissemination of Western-dominated architectural training.72 
The fact that he, his principles of Ekistics, and his global career were impli-
cated in this phenomenon seems unacknowledged, and Doxiadis himself 
seems to have been conflicted on the whole subject. As he did with Ecume-
nopolis, Doxiadis always characterized the “transition” from the local to the 
international as an unavoidable phenomenon73, something to be mediated 
but not challenged, which was very much in line with other aspects of the 
“developmentalist” school of thought. His simplistic view of the “local” and 
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74 In one of the Islamabad publi-
cations, Doxiadis attempted to 
describe, through a series of 
diagrams and photographs, the 
dilemma of “local style,” which 
skyscrapers were never a part of 
in Doxiadis’s logic. See Doxiadis 
Associates, On Architecture in Is-
lamabad (DOX-PA 115), (Athens: 
Doxiadis Associates, April 22, 
1961).
75 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and 
Cosmopolitanism,” in Perpetual 
Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cos-
mopolitan Ideal, edited by James 
Bohman and Matthias Lutz-
Bachmann, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1997), 32.
76 Nussbaum deliberately mentions 
that Hierocles is sourcing Cice-
ro’s earlier work on the subject. 
Nussbaum, 32-33.
77 Nussbaum, 33.
“international” is evidenced by his conflation of local with national, even in 
his work in Pakistan. His projects there–including Islamabad–are peppered 
with references to the elements of “local” (Pakistani) tradition, which he 
embraced. In this way, he lacked a sophisticated understanding of the post-
colonial environment that the bulk of his work was situated in, where local 
culture did not always match national boundaries. Doxiadis was perpetu-
ally in the middle, simultaneously the purveyor of international development 
(and all that came with it), and its detractor, attacking the negative symbols it 
created–corporate skyscrapers of a foreign style,74 automobile traffic disrupt-
ing/destroying traditional cities, etc.–continuously advocating for universal 
thinking, yet ridiculing the results of similar experiments elsewhere. He was 
the practitioner who tried to change from within, to aim toward balance as 
the march progressed toward the globalized world on the horizon.
The ELS, which categorized human settlements by size from the human 
(Anthropos) to the planetary (Ecumenopolis), is remarkably similar to a de-
scription of the Stoic philosopher Hierocles’s metaphor for affiliations within 
humanity.75 In reconciling the interface of local identity and worldly affili-
ation, Hierocles conceived of the human as being “surrounded by a series 
of concentric circles. The first circle is drawn around the self; the next takes 
in one’s immediate family; then follows the extended family; then, in order, 
one’s neighbors or local group, one’s fellow city dwellers, and one’s fellow 
countrymen. Outside all these circles is the largest one, that of humanity 
as a whole.”76 Whether Doxiadis drew from or knew of this work is not 
apparent, but the similarity is difficult to dismiss. In Martha Nussbaum’s 
reading of the Stoics, she argues that the point of articulating the concentric 
circles was to encourage a kind of mental flattening, or shrinking of them, 
to encourage people to see the rest of humanity as their neighbor.77 The act 
of rendering all of humanity together would foster the sense of value in it, 
and an identity with, a commonality with, one’s fellow mankind beyond the 
immediate affiliations of family or city or nation. Although Doxiadis’s scales 
are certainly a product of a modern technocratic approach to diagramming 
and ordering society, one could see them in a similar manner; by represent-
ing the totality of humanity in one chart, one might even draw personal 
affiliations across boundaries which the scale does not depict–the nation, the 
tribe, etc. By only using categories of size (and not the theme of national 
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78 Doxiadis, “Need of Entopia,” 
294.
identity) as means of identification, Doxiadis goes further than Hierocles in 
challenging the affiliation of the local. Hierocles’s units are human, familial, 
and national; Doxiadis’s are of built form, making Ecumenopolis, in this 
comparison, the proxy for humanity as a whole, which was always implicit 
in Doxiadis’s writing.78
Ecumenopolis was a project that, through built form, challenged the legiti-
macy of state boundaries, and the affiliations with them–a manifestation of 
the transnational structures that Doxiadis was surrounded by, pushed to an 
extreme by its physicality. Doxiadis, of course, did not live in his cosmopoli-
tan future; he lived in the 20th Century, and much of his career was con-
centrated in the “third world” context of post-independence nation-states, 
and the proliferation of national boundaries that came with them. Thus, 
his career always involved a projection of a long-term cosmopolitan dream 
onto the context of the nation-state. In the case of Islamabad, of course, the 
context of the nation was complicated by virtue of the capital city being a 
genre designed specifically for the playing out of nationalist ideology. It is in 
this incongruence–the overlapping and intertwining of visions and rational-
ity–that a study of Islamabad becomes fruitful.
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Chapter Three
THE CENTER(S) OF THE CITY
(AND THE STATE)
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3. THE CENTER(S) OF THE CITY
 (AND THE STATE)
Doxiadis and Ayub shared a faith in the rational pursuit of long-term visions, 
yet the visions within which they composed the project of Islamabad were 
distinctly non-isomorphic. The government sought to (literally) disentangle 
government from corrupting influences and represent the modern nation-
state through an isolated object, an exemplary symbol of nationalist ideology 
enveloped in the themes of progress and an “imagined”79 collective nation-
hood. Doxiadis’s brand of urban study was based on long-term thinking 
at a massive scale, one that extended beyond the nation-state, and, being 
his more significant project, he would have been inclined to see Islamabad 
within this much larger body of work.80 The incongruence of these motiva-
tions plays out in the development of Islamabad’s central axis and Capital 
Complex, and I argue that the uncovering of this story reveals not only that 
the area today reflects neither Ayub’s or Doxiadis’s dream, but is rather the 
result of what can arise from in between.
3.1 The Capital Complex
I don’t know if you have seen Islamabad today. Gio Ponti, Edward Stone 
etc., have designed quite a number of buildings there. I remember the Presi-
dent’s ‘Palace.’ A huge building at the end of one of the main roads on a 
beautiful site. It’s really a third class building. Anyway, the government got 
what they deserved.  –Mazharul Islam81
Islamabad’s presidential residence is a white concrete and marble edifice sitting 
atop a squared-off hilltop at the end of Islamabad’s wide axial boulevard. 
(See Figure 3) Flanked by the National Assembly Building and the Cabinet 
Building, the presidency has a privileged view of the city and a privileged 
position within it, and it is the most visible symbol of Pakistan’s bureaucracy 
and nationalist ideology. Edward Durell Stone, its architect, was not the 
first to work on Islamabad’s “Capital Complex.” Many practitioners were 
approached about, and submitted design proposals for, the project. These 
multiple designers worked on behalf of (and sometimes in reaction to) an 
anxious government impatiently yet quite uncertainly navigating the waters 
Edward Durell Stone’s FIGURE 26: 
U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. Sourced 
from Stone, Evolution of an Architect.
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82 Of his New Delhi Embassy, 
Stone wrote, “I elected to place 
the offices on two stories around 
a water garden to gain the 
cooling effect of the fountains 
and pool. To shade windows 
and other glass areas from the 
sun to reduce glare, I adopted a 
terrazzo grille for exterior walls–
an ancient principle in tropical 
climates... For proper shade I 
carried the canopy well beyond 
the wall of the building–be-
yond the reach of a cantilever–
so columns were required for 
support. These steel columns 
were finished with gold leaf and 
introduced a note of oriental op-
ulence. The result of solving all 
these considerations of climate 
and function produced a build-
ing type–a temple–almost as old 
as history... The architects of the 
Mogul Emperors were the first 
to perceive the feeling of seren-
ity given their temples by the re-
flection of temple images in calm 
lagoons. I placed a large circular 
lagoon in front of the Embassy to 
give the building the same sense 
of tranquility.” See Edward Durell 
Stone, Evolution of an Architect, 
(New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 
138-139.
of early nationhood. As the project evolved–a project meant to lend physical 
form to the ideals of a nation-state–Pakistan drafted and implemented a new 
constitution, went to war with India for a second time, and was beginning 
to feel the challenges of a physically discontinuous nation-state. By the time 
Edward Durell Stone came to work on the project, he had been working on 
the subcontinent for some years, promoting his attempt at an ornamental 
integration of “Mughal” and Modern.” Stone had recently completed the 
United States Embassy in New Delhi (See Figure 26) that, stripped to a 
modernist aesthetic, incorporated several building practices–deep overhangs 
(chujja), perforated walls (jaali), pools, gardens–which he considered locally 
situated references to a Mughal and climatic tradition.82 Stone’s “localized” 
aesthetic expression was considered by some elements in Pakistan’s govern-
ment to be perfect for expressing a “Pakistani” identity, never mind the fact 
that it had just been employed for an “American” one.
Hassan Urmani, who had earlier commissioned Stone for the nearby Atomic 
Energy Institute, was instrumental in getting Stone involved in the Islamabad 
project, according to historian Sten Nilsson. He records that Urmani wrote 
to Stone, stating:
Every time you come to Pakistan, I try to get you an assignment because we 
admire your love for the Mughal architecture and the spirit and grandeur the 
Mughal buildings emanate. . . Faruqui [the new CDA chief ] is very keen 
to get our Islamic heritage of architecture reflected in the public buildings of 
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTOR
NATIONAL PARK
CENTRAL AREA
RESIDENTIAL
SECTORS
RAWALPINDI
The Admin. Sector is FIGURE 27: 
located at the northern end of the city. 
Overlay over Master Plan.
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83 Sten Nilsson, “Palaces, Camps, 
Capitals”, in Lotus International, 
No 34, 1982, 125-127. Faruqui 
became the CDA Director in May 
1965, and the letter quoted was 
written to him in July of that year. 
Immediately following his ap-
pointment to that position (from 
that of personal secretary to 
Ayub Khan) he began to formal-
ly put pressure on Louis Kahn, 
who was engaged to work on 
the project at the time, to modify 
his designs to reflect an “Islamic 
touch.” Kahn was not interested 
in complying, and ultimately the 
job went to Stone the following 
year. 
84 Imran Ahmed should be credited 
with much of the research on this 
aspect of the present-day Capital 
Complex.
85 Doxiadis’s submission on the 
Administrative Area contained 
numerous perspective drawings 
of the Administrative Buildings, 
with detail akin to that of a Sche-
matic Design proposal. Doxiadis 
Associates, The Administrative 
Functions (DOX-PA 78), (Athens: 
Doxiadis Associates, May 11, 
1960)
Islamabad. He likes your designs for our Institute but has not seen the design 
of other buildings done by you throughout the world, particularly those 
which have domes, verandahs etc., typical of the old Moghul buildings.83
The approaching of Stone and his Mughal-ified ornamental Modernism 
by the government reflects the ongoing struggle within Pakistan to define 
the unifying elements of the “Pakistani” identity, and served to combine 
the twin motivations of Ricoeur’s paradox–employing the past in service of 
the future.84 While Stone’s project sits prominently in Islamabad today, the 
background story to this “third class” building is not well-compiled, and–in 
its telling–the story reflects a nation fumbling through its post-colonial 
formation and a gradual and unfortunate isolation of a nation’s people from 
their government.
3.2 The Capitol before Stone
Doxiadis appears to have had every intention of designing all the buildings 
within Islamabad’s Capital Complex85, but the government of Pakistan 
decided relatively early to invite several architects of international stature 
to provide proposals for the project, and they restricted Doxiadis’s role to 
his contract for the master plan. The “Administrative Sector” in Doxiadis’s 
plan for Islamabad was a large area of the city, and contained much more 
than just the symbolic buildings of today’s Capital Complex, including all 
the functions of the government bureaucracy and cultural institutions, all 
(Left) Land Use FIGURE 28: 
Diagram, showing centrally-located 
Legislative Function. Sourced from 
Doxiadis Associates, The Administra-
tive Functions.
(Right) Zoning of area FIGURE 29: 
in the Admin. Sector. Sourced from 
Doxiadis Associates, The Administra-
tive Functions.
Annotated model of the FIGURE 30: 
site for the Administrative Sector, 
highlighting the hillocks. Sourced 
from Doxiadis Associates, The Ad-
ministrative Functions.
Site photo from D.A.’s FIGURE 31: 
numerous site visits. Sourced from 
Doxiadis Associates, The Administra-
tive Functions.
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86 Doxiadis Associates, The Admin-
istrative Functions (DOX-PA 78), 
109. (Sketch 11: D-PA 1644 “Ten-
tative Location of Buildings to be 
Included in the Admin. Sector.”) 
The mosque in this list was never 
intended to be a major feature. In 
the same document, Doxiadis al-
located an area for the “National 
Mosque” in another location in 
the city, at the terminus of the 
Islamabad Highway. This is now 
the location of Faisal Mosque.
87 Doxiadis Associates, The Admin-
istrative Functions (DOX-PA 78), 
76-82.
spread out over many acres. Grouped together as the “Capitol” were four 
elements of central importance and highest priority–the Presidential Palace, 
Parliament, Supreme Court and a Mosque, which he located at a collec-
tion of hillocks at the end of the central axis of Capitol Avenue.86 Doxiadis 
had intentionally chosen the Capitol location for its topographical features, 
modest hills that he felt would accentuate the importance of government 
buildings and offer good views of and from them.87 (See Figures 28-31.)
Doxiadis’s first proposal for the layout of the Capitol was presented in the 
first major submittals to the Pakistan government in May 1960–The Admin-
istrative Functions. This scheme depicted the main government buildings as 
less of a collection of buildings than as a distribution of major buildings for 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
(highest hill)
MOSQUE
PRESIDENTIAL “PALACE”
SECRETARIAT
SUPREME COURT
NATIONAL LIBRARY
PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE
(hill in background)
Administrative Sector, FIGURE 32: 
Plan. May 11, 1960. Sourced from 
Doxiadis Associates, The Administra-
tive Functions. Labels by author.
Perspective of Admin-FIGURE 33: 
istrative Sector. May 11, 1960. Doxi-
adis Associates, The Administrative 
Functions.
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88 This is the name given to Brasil-
ia’s major monumental square, 
around which monumental build-
ings are arranged.
each of three governmental “powers,” each paired with a large plaza. At the 
foot of the Parliament was Legislative/Republic Square (the name varied), in 
front of the Presidential Palace was Presidential Square, and adjacent to the 
Supreme Court was Judicial Square. Importantly, the mosque was incorpo-
rated into Legislative Square (rather than as a “fourth power.”) Rather than 
three structures collected around one monumental plaza–symbolic buildings 
addressing each other across a singular public realm–each individual open 
space in Doxiadis’s plan was distinct, and only connected to each other by 
a long narrow esplanade. Rather than a “Plaza of the Three Powers,”88 he 
articulated three plazas of the powers. (It is necessary to clarify that Doxiadis 
distinguished between a “Presidential Palace” and a “Presidential Residence”, 
with the first being prominent and ceremonial and the second being private 
and functional.)
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89 Doxiadis Associates, The Admin-
istrative Functions (DOX-PA 78), 
5.
90 Doxiadis Associates, The Admin-
istrative Functions, DOX-PA 78, 
89.
91 Zahir-ud Deen Khwaja specu-
lates that this change was initiat-
ed by Yahya Khan – head of the 
Federal Capital Commission and 
Ayub’s right hand man – who, 
out of a “desire to win favour 
with President Ayub… put up a 
summary suggesting this altera-
tion to be made by the Planner, 
to which the President readily 
agreed.” Khwaja, 91.
92 Doxiadis Associates, Summary 
of Final Program and Plan 
(DOX-PA 93), (Athens: Doxi-
adis Associates, September 30, 
1960), 18-19.
At the time, it is important to remember, Pakistan had been under the lead-
ership of Ayub Khan for two years, the constitution had been suspended 
by Martial Law, and a new constitution was being formulated, but it was 
unknown how the constitution would come to structure the distribution of 
power. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Pakistan was “undergoing a period 
of constitutional re-orientation,” as Doxiadis put it,89 and a clear opportu-
nity to win favor with a presidential client, Doxiadis’s first scheme placed the 
legislative function of Parliament in the most prominent position–between 
the executive and judicial functions, more or less centered on the “dynamic” 
axis, and on top of the highest hill in the Capitol area–“Hill Number 17.” 
He rather weakly justified the scheme in his proposal, by writing:
The main axis of Islamabad focuses on Hill No. 17. The question arises as to 
whether on Hill No. 17, which is the centre of the whole synthesis, we should 
have the Presidential Palace or the Parliament. However, this is a decision 
to be taken by the appropriate authorities and in keeping with the symbolic 
character to be given to these buildings. In our sketches, however, the Par-
liament is shown on Hill No. 17. On the basis of this idea, we proceed to 
locating the 3 basic functions within the administrative sector: the legislative 
function at the focus of the core of Islamabad, with the two other powers, 
judicial and executive on either side of it.90
Typical of Doxiadis’ publically apolitical sensibility, he ultimately yielded 
the decision to the “appropriate authorities.” Only months later, in the pub-
lication of Doxiadis’s Final Master Plan in September of 1960, the arrange-
ment of buildings was modified upon the request of the government, with 
the placement of the Presidential Palace on the hill, a change that remained 
consistent all the way through to Stone’s built scheme years later.91 In 
addition to the relocation of the Palace, this revised scheme articulated both 
a further refinement of the central functions–the Supreme Court became 
part of a “Judicial Center,” and a sub-category of “Cultural” buildings was 
added–and a clearer expression of the public space. In this final scheme, 
Doxiadis proposed the covering of National Avenue with a colossal (110 
yards x 850 yards) at-grade pedestrian platform (over a depressed road), and 
showed the beginnings of another public esplanade extending perpendicu-
larly from the Presidential Palace, along Capital Avenue to the southwest.92
If anything can be read into Doxiadis’s initial schemes, it would be their 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
MOSQUE
PRESIDENTIAL “PALACE”
(highest hill)
SECRETARIAT
SUPREME COURT
NATIONAL LIBRARY
PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE
(hill in background)
Perspective of Final Ad-FIGURE 34: 
ministrative Sector design. Sourced 
from Doxiadis Associates, The Spirit 
of Islamabad.
Administrative Sector, FIGURE 35: 
Plan. September 30, 1960. Sourced 
from Doxiadis Associates, Summary 
of Final Programme and Plan. Labels 
by author.
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generic ambivalence. While he made a clear decision to recognize the sig-
nificance of placing the legislature on the hill, he allowed the “decision to be 
taken by the appropriate authorities.” Although architecturally different from 
that of Chandigarh and Brasilia, Doxiadis’s scheme follows the same general 
thinking, which equated large open plazas with “publicness” and accessibili-
ty, thus giving physical form to the notion that a free people would have easy 
and unquestioned access to government. One gets the feeling from Doxi-
adis’s proposals, however, that he was driven more by an interest in creating 
an “acropolic” structure atop Hill 17 than by determining its monumental 
symbolic function. Had he any particular conviction about the importance 
of enhancing the Legislature over the Executive, he could have done so by 
minimizing the expression of the “Presidential Palace” on the hill. Instead, 
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93 What was at the time called 
“Ayub-Nagar”, or the “Second 
Capital” in Dhaka became “Sher-
e-Bangla Nagar” after Bangla-
desh became independent in 
1971. It now houses the Bangla-
desh National Assembly.
94 Khwaja, 95
95 The list included “Robert Matthew, 
Gio Ponti, Marcel Breuer, Arne 
Jacobsen, Sven Markelius and 
others.” Khwaja, 95.
96 That Rosselli is largely respon-
sible for the Secretariat is the 
recollection of Khwaja. Khwaja, 
104.
97 According to Khwaja, “some sar-
castic remarks were passed by 
some of the secretaries that it re-
sembled the oil storage tanks of 
the local refinery.” When asked, 
Jacobsen refused to change the 
proposal and walked away from 
the project. Khwaja, 100.
the building appears just as monumental as the original Legislature, which 
reinforces the implied power of the Presidency. Meanwhile, his architec-
tural expressions of the Capitol are uninspired, and his approach resembles 
a recycled version of established aesthetics and relationships between monu-
mental buildings and platforms and in the drawing of a relationship between 
citizens and government. One wonders, in retrospect, whether Doxiadis’s 
weak reasoning of his position, and rendering of a monumental “Presidential 
Palace” facilitated the relocation of the Presidency. More than likely, these 
can be attributed to the pragmatic side of a career characterized equally by 
theory and practice, one that was committed to broad societal gains through 
development, and not on taking ideological stances on symbolic issues that 
might have risked the project, not to mention his contract.
3.3 Louis Kahn in Islamabad
Louis Kahn was approached in 1963 regarding potential work in Islamabad, 
and he was the first after Doxiadis’s Master Plan to compose designs for a 
collection of buildings that could be called a “Capital Complex.” Kahn had 
just recently begun work in East Pakistan on the design of the then-called 
Second Capital in Dhaka, one of his most well-known projects.93 Two years 
prior to Kahn’s arrival in Islamabad, the Capital Development Authority 
(CDA)–the state body tasked with developing the city–decided that the com-
mission for individual buildings in the Administrative Sector would not go to 
Doxiadis.94 Instead the government had aimed to engage an architect of in-
ternational repute to design the major buildings, with Doxiadis remaining as 
Master Planner. In his memoirs, Zahir-ud Deen Khwaja (who was planning 
director with the CDA at the time) recalls that, after being declined by both 
Walter Gropius and Kenzo Tange to design the entire area, the government 
switched to an alternative plan of inviting a collection of Western architects, 
all with Modernist sensibilities, to consult on individual buildings.95 Gio 
Ponti was the first to build in the capital city, starting with a government 
hostel, and later the Secretariat buildings, which were, according to Khwaja, 
largely the work of his partner, Alberto Rosselli.96 Marcel Breuer visited the 
site but could not come to an agreement with the Pakistan government, and 
Arne Jacobsen was hired to work on the National Assembly Building, but his 
designs were ridiculed by the government and rejected rather quickly.97
Site Visits by Foreign FIGURE 36: 
Architects. Clockwise from top left: 
Marcel Breuer, Gio Ponti, and a group 
meeting with various consulting archi-
tects, including  Sir Robert Matther, 
Gio Ponti, Alberto Rosselli, Arne Ja-
cobsen, and Louis Kahn (top left). 
Sourced from Khwaja.
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98 “In appointing me,” Faruqui 
wrote, “the government gave me 
a directive to see that the archi-
tecture of the major public build-
ings in Islamabad has an Islamic 
touch, reflecting our past tradi-
tions and culture.” N.A. Faruqui, 
Letter to Robert Matthew, May 
11, 1965, Folder 030.11.A.82.84, 
Louis I Kahn Collection, Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania and the Penn-
sylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission.
99 The Louis Kahn Collection at 
The University of Pennsylvania 
contains multiple copies of con-
By 1963, Ponti/Rosselli’s Secretariat was under construction and Arne 
Jacobsen was on the verge of being relieved of his contract for the National 
Assembly. As previously noted, the Constitution was under revision, and 
in that climate the subject of the influence of Islam on the Republic (and 
its symbols) was under much discussion. Many of the architects who were 
interested in working in Islamabad ran into contractual issues, and those 
who produced design work were consistently scrutinized for their lack of the 
“Islamic Touch.”98 Louis Kahn had this eventual fate as well, but he eagerly 
took the project on. Doxiadis remained briefly as the master planner for the 
Administrative Sector, but his contract ended soon after Kahn began his 
work. Sir Robert Matthew, who was initially invited to design buildings in 
Islamabad, was placed in the position of “Coordinating Architect” amongst 
the various consultants working in the sector, and he acted as an intermedi-
ary between the Pakistan government and individual architects like Kahn. 
Kahn’s work in Islamabad lasted just over two years, and he never seemed 
to have had a signed contract, despite his earnest efforts to gain one.99 Over 
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tract drafts, and much correspon-
dence related to its continuous 
revision. The dispute boiled down 
to the payment of tax revenue in 
Pakistan, and no copy within the 
archives includes a signature of 
any official from Pakistan. The 
bulk of the correspondence relat-
ing to the contractual difficulties is 
located in Folder 030.11.A.82.27, 
Louis I Kahn Collection, Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania and the Penn-
sylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission.
100 In correspondence between 
Louis Kahn’s office and the 
office of Sir Robert Matthew, Roy 
Vollmer inquired as to the spe-
cific intentions of the “Pedestrian 
Promenade and Central Square 
adjacent to the Parliament Build-
ing” as well as information on the 
surrounding buildings labeled 
by Doxiadis as “Special Institu-
tions.” Roy Vollmer, Jr. Letter 
to John Richards, RMJM, June 
12, 1964, Folder 030.11.A.82.4, 
Louis I Kahn Collection, Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania and the Penn-
sylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission.
101 Kahn appears to have undertak-
en the Supreme Court program 
on his own. Multiple contracts 
were drafted and re-worked over 
the course of the project, and 
the Supreme Court is not listed 
in these drafts, including the 
final draft. This provides a good 
explanation for its appearance 
as less complete in his draw-
ings and models. This final con-
tract, sent to Pakistan on August 
16, 1965, is located in Folder 
030.11.A.82.25, Louis I Kahn 
Collection, University of Penn-
sylvania and the Pennsylvania 
Historical and Museum Commis-
sion.
time, the scope of his work grew from the single building of the President’s 
House (which he was initially approached about) to include buildings such 
as the National Assembly, The Supreme Court, and other buildings and 
associated public spaces, such as a Museum of Islamic History/Council of 
Islamic Ideology, that varied with each submission.
It is unclear how familiar Kahn was with Doxiadis’s master plan, although he 
did have access to the documents.100 His proposals challenged from the outset 
Doxiadis’s intention of stringing a series of public spaces along National 
Avenue. Kahn’s first scheme in Islamabad was strictly for the “President’s 
Estate” (as his office termed it), which was to be sited atop “Hill Number 
17” as prescribed. Kahn proposed that the “Presidential Square” of Doxi-
adis’s master plan be located atop the hill with the President’s House and 
Secretariat offices, and a “Museum of Islamic Ideology,” rather than at the 
bottom. The Presidential Square was to be accessed from the Southeast via 
an additional square surrounded by the “Council of Islamic Ideology,” which 
then connected to the Assembly, Supreme Court and associated squares (by 
other architects) along Doxiadis’s esplanade-lined National Avenue. This 
initial scheme removed the Presidential Square from the immediately-public 
realm and gave it the feeling of a background building, foregrounded by the 
lower functions, including the new “Islamic-themed” program that he pre-
sumably added independently. His adding the program of a museum to the 
hilltop simultaneously amplified its condition as a destination and increased 
its public accessibility. Kahn’s treatment of religious program is interesting, 
and implies that he was taken by the idea of Islam’s influence on Pakistani 
“identity,” but typical to Kahn’s work, he incorporated it into a decidedly 
modern aesthetic.
Kahn’s schemes entered a second phase of development rather quickly, as 
they began to incorporate additional programmatic elements, including the 
National Assembly (formerly by Arne Jacobsen), a major public square, and 
the Supreme Court.101 These plans (although architecturally in flux) are rela-
tively similar with respect to the overall layout of buildings on the site. The 
President’s House was consistently on the hill, and two buildings were con-
sistently located on National Avenue–the National Assembly, and a building 
that combined the Cabinet and Council of Islamic Ideology. Kahn consis-
tently located the Supreme Court across National Avenue, adding to the 
PRESIDENTIAL SQUARE 
President’s House
Museum of Islamic History
COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY
Louis Kahn, first pro-FIGURE 37: 
posal for President’s Estate. Sourced 
from Heinz Ronner, Louis I Kahn: 
Complete Work, 1935-1974. Labels 
by author.
Louis Kahn, sketch FIGURE 38: 
of proposal for President’s Estate. 
Sourced from Heinz Ronner, Louis I 
Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-1974. 
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102 “Central Square” begins to 
appear on correspondence re-
lating to the project shortly after 
Kahn’s scope grew in late 1964. 
This is based on Meeting minutes 
observed in the Louis I Kahn Col-
lection, University of Pennsylva-
nia and the Pennsylvania Histori-
cal and Museum.
103 It is unclear from the archival ma-
terial who initiated the concept 
of a “National Monument.” One 
possibility is that the CDA re-
quested Kahn to produce such 
an element when he took on the 
extra program around “Central 
Square.” This possibility is rein-
forced by a telegram sent from 
the CDA to Kahn, which reads: 
“REFERENCE LAST MEETING 
IN OCTOBER HELD IN RAWAL-
PINDI. HOPE YOU WILL BRING 
WITH YOU PROPOSALS AND 
DESIGNS OF COMMEMORA-
TIVE ARCHWAY AND NATION-
AL MONUMENT.” Capital Devel-
opment Authority, Telegram to 
Louis Kahn, December 30, 1964, 
Folder 030.11.A.82.7, Louis I 
Kahn Collection, University of 
Pennsylvania and the Pennsyl-
vania Historical and Museum 
Commission.
consolidation of what had been a distribution of squares in Doxiadis’s plan, 
into one major public space. In this “Central Square,”102 as it came to be 
called–faced on three sides by the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, and 
the new institution dedicated to Islamic Studies and with the Supreme Court 
across the street–Kahn indicated what was called a “National Monument,” 
which was to function as a large “roofless hall of meeting” both for secular 
and religious purposes.103 As his schemes evolved over the year 1965, this 
component of Kahn’s proposal grew to be a central one, while the buildings 
at its perimeter changed programmatically and architecturally.
Kahn’s proposal was constantly changing and, since it was never built, we 
are left only to draw conclusions from the material left behind, the limited 
recorded thoughts of those involved, and Kahn’s larger body of work. From 
this material, certain things are evident. There is a clear dominance of the 
National Assembly building in his work. Always the most monumental in ex-
pression (perhaps due to the overlap of this project with the Dhaka project), 
the Assembly was consistently located immediately adjacent to the Central 
Square, The Presidential structures were, although clearly intricate and archi-
tecturally interesting, always depicted as being integrated into the hill–more 
distant from the square and connected to it only by a secondary connection, 
and/or through other program, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology. 
Compared to Doxiadis’s schemes, Kahn’s work is much more nuanced in its 
expression of a “balance of power,” and he clearly prioritizes the Legislative 
branch of government. While the Executive remains on the hill, presumably 
as specified by the government, the Legislative branch is adjacent to and at 
the same level as the large plaza. In the face of Kahn’s work, both Doxiadis’s 
Parliament and President’s Palace atop the hill seem definitively “Acropolic” 
in their temple-like prominence. Kahn’s consolidation of public space into 
one large plaza is also fundamentally different from Doxiadis’s approach. 
More in line with the high modernist projects of Brasilia and Chandigarh, 
Kahn’s Central Square can be read as an attempt to express a highly acces-
sible secular government.
In 1965, while the bulk of Kahn’s work was being designed, Pakistan and 
India went to war. The heightened nationalism of wartime, not to mention 
the general distraction of it, affected the Islamabad project. As the country 
and its citizenry were faced with the reminder of who they were not, i.e. 
PRESIDENCY
CABINET AND COUNCIL ON 
ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY
“NATIONAL MONUMENT”
SUPREME COURT
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Model, Louis Kahn. FIGURE 40: 
Undated, believed to be Fall/Winter 
of 1964/1965. Sourced from Heinz 
Ronner, Louis I Kahn: Complete 
Work, 1935-1974. Labels same as 
above.
Model, Louis Kahn. FIGURE 39: 
Undated, believed to be Fall/Winter 
of 1964. Sourced from Heinz Ronner, 
Louis I Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-
1974. Labels by author.
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PRESIDENCY
MUSEUM OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
“CENTRAL SQUARE” AND
NATIONAL MONUMENT
SUPREME COURT
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Model, Louis Kahn. FIGURE 41: 
Undated, believed to be mid-1965. 
Sourced from Heinz Ronner, Louis I 
Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-1974. 
Labels by author.
Site Plan sketch, Louis FIGURE 42: 
Kahn. This is believed to represent 
his final scheme prior to termina-
tion. Believed to be December 1965. 
Sourced from Heinz Ronner, Louis I 
Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-1974.
Model, Louis Kahn. FIGURE 43: 
This is believed to represent his final 
scheme prior to termination. Believed 
to be December 1965. Sourced from 
Heinz Ronner, Louis I Kahn: Com-
plete Work, 1935-1974.
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Sketch, Louis Kahn. In-FIGURE 44: 
dicates some final intentions for the 
“National Monument.”: “The monu-
ment – The walls of a high room 
enclose a court. From the court one 
sees bands of concrete and marble. 
Inscribed in the marble is the Koran. 
The high room around a square is 
surrounded by shops and tea terrac-
es.” as quoted in Heinz Ronner, Louis 
I Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-1974.
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104 Kahn wrote rather personally 
to Robert Matthew that “The in-
sistence of the Islamic touch is 
plaguing and insidious, but in 
spite of this, it can stimulate re-
sources not called on before.” 
Despite his stated optimism, 
Kahn was fired three and a half 
months later. Louis Kahn, Letter 
to Robert Matthew, August 27, 
1965, Folder 030.11.A.82.08, 
Louis I Kahn Collection, Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania and the Penn-
sylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission.
105 On Jan 11, 1966, Kahn sent 
a telegram to his office from a 
meeting in Rawalpindi, which 
stated simply “STOP ALL WORK 
ON PRESIDENT ESTATE 
LOST JOB BELIEVE STONE 
IS ARCHITECT LOUIS.” Stone 
refused to begin work until Kahn 
was paid in full for his Islamabad 
contract. Kahn was paid in May 
of 1966, and one assumes that 
– given the contractual difficulty 
he had with Pakistan – he would 
have not received it had it not 
been for Stone’s assistance. Ad-
ditionally, a newspaper clipping 
found in the Louis Kahn archives 
(Newspaper name unknown, 
India, Islam quickly became a default representative of Pakistani “identity” 
(see Chapter 1). This developed into an explicit call to incorporate an 
“Islamic” aesthetic into Islamabad’s expression of Pakistani nationhood. 
Despite Kahn’s inclusion of the “Islamic-themed” programs in the Capital 
Complex, and his attempt to incorporate religious functions in the public 
space, Kahn was not an architect who was bound to be interested in such an 
overtly aesthetic demand.104 Kahn was dismissed from the project in early 
1966, and Edward Durell Stone eagerly jumped in.105
By the time Stone became involved in the Capital Complex project, Pakistan 
was eager for a solution, and Stone’s proposals were quickly adapted. His 
scheme involved the squaring off of the hill and enveloping its southwest 
side with the tall façade of the Presidential Palace. Flanking its two sides were 
the Cabinet Building (originally the “Foreign Office Building”) and National 
Assembly. By eliminating the hill, the President’s House appears much larger 
than its programmatic context and it dominates–in height and bulk–the two 
other functions. Although the general layout did not change, Stone’s plan 
was altered along the way. Stone’s first rendering of the complex (which has 
more Islamic ornament, including pointed arches and a dome)106 shows the 
buildings in much the same position as they were realized, although with one 
key difference. He depicts the spaces in between the three buildings as open 
Edward Durell Stone’s FIGURE 45: 
earlier sketch for the Presidency 
and forecourt. Sourced from Nilsson, 
Palaces.
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presumed to be from Pakistan) 
from April 11, 1966, eliminates 
any definitely stated in print that 
“Reasons for rejection of Mr. 
Kahn’s designs is believed to be 
his inability to modify designs so 
as to reflect Pakistan’s desire to 
introduce Islamic architecture 
in Islamabad public buildings.” 
Folders 030.11.A.82.25 and 
82.26, 82.30 and 82.33, Louis 
I Kahn Collection, University of 
Pennsylvania and the Pennsyl-
vania Historical and Museum 
Commission. See also a detailed 
description of Stone’s correspon-
dence with Faruqui and Urmani 
regarding the Islamabad project 
in Nilsson, Palaces, 125-127.
106 Khwaja considers these aes-
thetic components to be pan-
dering on the part of Stone to 
please Faruqui as Chairman. 
He attributes this to his general 
impression of Stone (“A sales-
man selling a doubtful quality 
of wares”) and to the fact that 
these features disappeared after 
Faruqui was replaced the fol-
lowing year. [Khwaja, 122]. One 
wonders whether Kahn would 
have remained on the job had 
Faruqui, the “great protagonist 
of Islamic architecture”, [Khwaja, 
117] not come to be Chairman.
107 The Constitution of 1962 was 
replaced by the Constitution 
of 1973, which established the 
Prime Minister as the more pow-
erful of the two, as well as a bi-
cameral Legislature. After that 
change, not only did the Presi-
dent’s House dominate in a 
country which had just re-posi-
tioned it, the spaces for the Leg-
islature needed renovation as 
well. Khwaja, 118.
to the public. Functionally, this would have given the people of Pakistan the 
same kind of access to the National Assembly building as Kahn’s proposal, 
yet in a public plaza overlooked by a monumental structure representing 
the Executive branch of government–is a far cry from the subtlety of Kahn’s 
Presidential residence.
Ultimately, the entire complex was fenced off and was never opened to the 
public in the way Stone, or any other architect, had envisioned. The Con-
stitution of 1962 laid out a Presidential form of government and Ayub’s 
approach to indirect democratic rule. This project can be seen as the expe-
riential equivalent to this new document107–limited access to government, 
and a public overseen by a paternalistic Presidency, enwrapped in symbolic 
ornament. 
3.4 Doxiadis’s “Dynamic” Center: Where City Meets State
In the plans for Chandigarh and Brasilia, the 1950s modernist cities-from-
scratch that, as contemporaries of his own project, Doxiadis often compared 
to Islamabad, the preeminence of government functions can easily be read 
in the master plan. Chandigarh’s “head” stands out as an isolated collection 
of buildings at the edge of the city, and Brasilia’s monumental axis and Plaza 
of the Three Powers comprise the torso and head of the city’s iconic form. 
Both were attempts to quite literally express the democratic ideals of new 
nations and capitals through bold architectural and urban form–individual 
buildings arranged to address one another across vast public open plazas as 
cast-in-place diagrams of the democratic process. Both Capital Complexes 
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108 Vale, 149.
109 Doxiadis Associates, Preliminary 
Program and Plan (DOX-PA 77), 
132. Doxiadis speculated wildly 
in his picturing of other new 
modes of transportation that Dy-
napolis would involve, referring 
to “new means of transportation 
– the helicopter, even the rocket 
may very soon take over part of 
the traffic.”
sit physically isolated as monumental symbols of the state, and the rest of the 
city remains in the background, clearly articulating a hierarchy at the urban 
scale. At first glance, Doxiadis’s central axis appears also to be for the precise 
purpose of lending similar hierarchy to Islamabad, as it is anchored at one 
end in the city’s Capitol. Some readings of the city, naturally, describe the 
axis and Capital Complex (as built) as a symbolic expression of government 
power, a monumental axis on par with that of Brasilia or Delhi.108 Indeed, 
such a comparison is reasonable; the Presidential Residence sits squarely 
centered at the end of the long axial boulevard. The boulevard’s buildings 
fade to the background, leaving one with no doubts as to the privileged 
position of the Presidency or to the city’s role as chief representative of na-
tionhood. Yet, the boulevard today is just as much a product of a series of 
decisions over time as are the buildings of the Capital Complex, and they 
have very little resemblance to Doxiadis’s original intention. A closer reading 
of Doxiadis’s urban plan (as designed) reveals a deliberate intention on his 
part for a more complex inter-relationship of a city and the expressions of a 
state.
Doxiadis’s conceptualization of the “city center” is rooted in his theory of 
Dynapolis–“The Ideal City of the Future.” This proposition was relatively 
simple; although, the distinction between simple and simplistic is a fine one 
in this case. The theory boiled down to the idea that cities were fundamen-
tally changing, both as a result of a significant increase in urban migration 
and the introduction of automobiles. Not only were existing cities “com-
pletely inadequate for the machine age,” but urbanization was occurring at a 
pace that demanded a reconsideration of how the central functions of cities 
were composed.109 As cities grew, Doxiadis argued that their city centers 
needed to expand and, rather than allow their growth to “cannibalize” the 
surrounding urban fabric, space should be allocated for “central functions” 
to physically expand. In Doxiadis’s time, the automobile was indeed a major 
subject of discussion amongst urbanists, but Doxiadis rarely backed up his 
claims with more than anecdotal sentiments or very general statistical data 
delivered in a declarative manner. One quickly gets the feeling from his 
writing that the Dynapolis proposal was driven more by a pre-determined 
conviction about how cities should develop than as an argument backed up 
by hard evidence.
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110 Eric Mumford describes the de-
velopment of the “fifth function” in 
some detail. He posits that Sert’s 
commitment to a “civic function” 
to cities, beyond CIAM’s Four 
Functions (Dwelling, Work, Rec-
reation, and Transportation), was 
influenced by Lewis Mumford’s 
criticism of Sert’s work and his 
general advocacy for such a func-
tion in cities. The “Ciudade Dos 
Motores” project in Brazil, which 
Sert designed with Paul Lester 
Weiner in 1943, is described by 
E. Mumford as Sert’s first experi-
ment with allocating space spe-
cifically to a civic function in the 
city. Mumford, 131-145.
111 J.L. Sert, “Centres of Communi-
ty Life” in The Heart of the City: 
Towards the Humanisation of 
Urban Life. CIAM 8, edited by 
Tyrwhitt, J.; Sert, J.L.; Rogers, 
E.N., (New York: Pellegrini and 
Cudahy, 1952), 4.
112 J.L. Sert, “The Human Scale in 
City Planning,” in New Architec-
ture and City Planning: A Sym-
posium, edited by Paul Zucker, 
(New York: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1971), 403-404.
Doxiadis’s obsession with the “center” of cities was not unique in his time. 
The question of the city center was of increasing interest in the post-war era 
by the likes of the avant-garde of CIAM and general practitioners throughout 
the West. Europe’s cities had been devastated by World War II, and cities in 
the United States were expanding rapidly through suburbanization, leaving 
downtown areas in both emptied. Dynapolis was developed within this larger 
context of thinking on city centers, as both Doxiadis’s particular solution to 
the problem of existing cities, and as a preventative measure for new ones. 
J.L. Sert, Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design and founder of its 
Urban Design Program, wrote extensively on the subject of the city “core,” 
which gained traction within the architectural discipline as a kind of “Fifth 
Function” of the CIAM Functionalist City.110 The issue became the focus 
of official attention during Sert’s Presidency at CIAM (1947-1956); Both 
CIAM’s 1947 Conference on the “Reconstruction of the Cities” and the 
1951 Conference on the “Heart of the City” produced and spurred copious 
literature on the subject of postwar reconstruction and the city “core.”
“To put an end to this unplanned decentralization process,” (of suburban-
ization) Sert wrote, “we must reverse the trend, establishing what we may 
call a process of recentralization.”111 While the time period saw much specu-
lation on new communication and transportation technology influencing 
urban form (Marshall McLuhan’s commitment to networks, Le Corbusier’s 
hierarchy of roads, for example), Sert asserted, in his key texts on the subject, 
“The Human Scale in City Planning,” (1944) the societal need for “civic 
centers” in cities:
This civic and cultural center constitutes the most important element of a 
big city, its brain and governing machine. It is at the same time the highest 
exponent of civic life… In it should be found: the university buildings, 
the main museums, the central public library, the main concert hall and 
theatres, the stadium and area for Olympic games, the central adminis-
tration buildings (for local regional and sometimes national governments), 
central park, and areas especially planned for public gatherings, the main 
monuments constituting land marks for the region, and symbols of popular 
aspirations should also be found there.112
Doxiadis seemed to have similar convictions on the necessity of city centers. 
Although he operated at the fringes of CIAM, he had established a close 
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113 In the mid-1950s, Tyrwhitt began 
serving as editor of the Ekistics 
journal. For more detail on Tyr-
whitt and her relationship with 
Doxiadis, see Wigley, 95.
114 “Central Area” is Doxiadis’s most 
early term for the built form along 
the central axis. The meaning 
and terminology used by Doxi-
adis to describe if shifted over the 
course of the project – both in the 
distinction between the national 
and municipal functions, and in 
that he at times referred to it as a 
“Central Area,” and at others as 
a “Civic Center.” Doxiadis Asso-
ciates. Basic Considerations of 
the Central Area (DOX-PA 172), 
(Athens: Doxiadis Associates, 
March 31, 1962).
115 This area was considered to be 
“Community Class VI” in Doxi-
adis’s ELS parlance – a “large 
city”, which he estimated would 
include 153,000 people, includ-
ing 6,000 housed in the Central 
Area. [Doxiadis Associates. Basic 
Considerations of the Central 
Area (DOX-PA 172), 11-12] Fol-
lowing the first phase, Doxiadis 
envisioned new phases of the 
“Central Area” being developed 
along the axis. “This is the only 
way in which we can preserve 
the investment in the city, both in 
the economic and cultural way... 
This is the only was in which we 
will be able to save our city from 
the pressures which transform it 
by force and eventually lead to 
its death.” Doxiadis Associates. 
The Spirit of Islamabad (DOX-PA 
127), (Athens: Doxiadis Associ-
ates, July 21, 1961), 12.
116 Doxiadis listed four categories 
of space in the “center”: Com-
mercial, Civic, Social, and Trans-
portation. The evidence used as 
a basis for developing the pro-
portions of spaces was phased 
in the following way: “In many 
respects, therefore, this study 
had to be based on the general 
partnership with the omni-present CIAM figure of Jacqueline Tyrwhitt in 
the publication of the Ekistics journal,113 and exposure to CIAM’s thinking 
likely came through contact with her. Even so, the issue of the “center” was, 
by the time Doxiadis’s career was launched in the 1950s, established as a sig-
nificant subject of post-war design thinking. Doxiadis’s design of Islamabad’s 
“Central Area”114 fits within Sert’s general school of thought. Although, 
Doxiadis wrote and spoke of such “centers” simply as necessary components 
to cities, stressing their fundamental need rather than their embodiment of 
any notion of the “public sphere” specifically.
In the master plan for Islamabad, Doxiadis’s “Dynamic” center is the most 
recognizable element–a widening blue hatched area shooting like a lightning 
bolt along the city’s central axis from the northeast to the southwest. The 
“Central Area” for Islamabad’s first phase of development was to serve the 
sectors from the Administrative Area through E8/F8/G8. From then on, 
further development of the Central Area would occur along the axis.115 Its 
form was to be a rather tightly knit collection of low buildings stretching 
along the axis from the Capital Complex, comprising of commercial, retail, 
residential and civic uses.116 In keeping with a commitment to separate 
vehicular and pedestrian traffic, Doxiadis located the Central Area along the 
northwestern edge of Capital Avenue (now Jinnah Avenue) and oriented it 
toward pedestrian circulation at its interior, rather than to the Avenue. Thus, 
the road–conceived of as a highway–and the Central Area were distinctly 
different entities to him. Not quite at an architectural scale, yet showing a 
high degree of definition and prescription in building layout, the Central 
Area scheme is somewhere between a schematic architectural proposal and 
a master plan, and it exhibits many of Doxiadis’s key principles–the integra-
tion of the natural landscape, dense development of a low height, mixed 
programs, and the separation of traffic modes. This mixed-use element was 
to be connected laterally to the centers of neighboring sectors, via smaller-
scale mixed-use connections.
Proposed Layout of FIGURE 47: 
Central Area. Sourced from Doxiadis 
Associates, Public Buildings and Civic 
Centre areas - Proposed Layout. No. 
37, DOX-PA 204, (Sept. 1962), 23. 
As appears in Mahsud, Dissertation 
Book II, 146.
The Central Area, the FIGURE 46: 
first phase of “Dynapolis” in Islam-
abad. Sourced from Doxiadis Asso-
ciates, Basic Considerations of the 
Central Area.
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Central Area, model. FIGURE 48: 
Sourced from Kyrtsis.
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experience of our office in re-
search work which we are carry-
ing out and on data taken from 
existing cities.” Doxiadis Associ-
ates. Basic Considerations of the 
Central Area (DOX-PA 172), 2. In 
other relevant reports that I have 
found, the origin of this evidence 
is not given, but rather seems to 
be based in intuition.
A most interesting element of the Central Area scheme is the distinction 
drawn between the functions of the city and the functions of the state. 
Doxiadis specifically addressed this in a report published in 1962, entitled 
Basic Considerations of the Central Area:
The whole central area of Islamabad consists of two different types of 
functions. These are:
a. Functions of national character
b. Functions of local character
In the first category we have functions which are related to the capital of the 
country, functions which have nothing to do with the services for the popula-
“The Heart of the CIty”, FIGURE 49: 
explaining Doxiadis’s conception of 
Islamabad’s dual-center. Sourced 
from Doxiadis Associates, Prelimi-
nary Program and Plan.
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117 Doxiadis Associates, Basic Con-
siderations of the Central Area 
(DOX-PA 172), 4. The report goes 
on the say that “On this basis, the 
Master Plan which has been ap-
proved provides for the creation 
of functions of national character 
northeast from the principal road 
which lies to the west of, and is 
parallel to, the National Avenue. 
On the other hand, all functions 
southwest of this axis are func-
tions of the second category, that 
is functions related to the life of 
the city.”
tion of the city but which are meant to serve the nation as a whole.
In the second category, on the contrary, we have only functions related to the 
life of the city itself.117
This points to a clear distinction between how Ayub’s government envisioned 
Islamabad–a modestly-sized administrative city comfortably isolated to 
enable an “objective” bureaucracy–and how Doxiadis did–a city that would 
grow well beyond its administrative identity into a “City of the Future.” 
Surely, the idea of an exclusively administrative city would be impossible to 
maintain over time, but Doxiadis was deliberate in planning for a city with 
a “life” (and a “center”) of its own from the beginning. This is indeed rare in 
comparison to other modernist purpose-built capitals, where the functions of 
municipal and national governance were distinct and non-integrated. While 
he drew a clear line between municipal/civil and state/national functions, 
Doxiadis’s design and writing demands an intertwined relationship between 
such functions. In his first report on Islamabad’s administrative functions, 
Doxiadis wrote:
Thus, and on the basis of the theory and the principles of the city of the 
future, –Dynapolis–, we are led to the normal conclusion that the adminis-
trative sector as well as the central sector of the city (commerce, local govern-
ment, etc.) should both begin at the focus of the ideal city of the future… The 
Capitol of the city, and by Capitol we mean the complex of the Presidential 
“ZONE OF INTERFACE”
ISLAMABAD TOWN HALL
Detail of “Central Area” FIGURE 50: 
plan, showing Town Hall. Labels by 
author. Sourced from Mahsud, Dis-
sertation Book II, 146.
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118 Doxiadis Associates, The Admin-
istrative Functions (DOX-PA 78), 
74.
119 Doxiadis Associates. Basic Con-
siderations of the Central Area 
(DOX-PA 172), 6.
120 Doxiadis Associates, “Islamabad: 
Public Buildings and Civic Center 
Area Plot Layout Information,” in 
EXISTICS, Nov. 1965, 109-112. 
According to this report, leveling 
the two heights would amount to 
a 9-10 story Town Hall.
Palace and the Parliament House, should be in the heart of the city. It is 
from here that the Administrative sector will have to be developed towards 
the hills in order to spread along them, it is from here that the local centre 
(administrative, shopping, etc.) should be developed towards the city.118
Doxiadis clearly acknowledged that the Capitol had symbolic importance 
as a kind of “heart” of the city, and his deliberate placement of it at the 
end of the axis lends it prominence in the city. Here, however, we can see 
that–although the two were conflated by Doxiadis’s overly simplistic graphic 
representation of Dynapolis–Doxiadis was attempting to, albeit crudely, 
establish a balance of power between the local and the national. The distinc-
tion between the two centers is amplified by the programmatic juxtaposition 
within the plan of the symbols of the state–the Capital Complex–and the 
city–Islamabad’s Town Hall. In describing the interface between the city and 
the state, Doxiadis wrote:
Special functions for the headquarters of the city administration, such as 
the Town Hall, are considered to be the link between the central area with 
city functions and the central area of national functions. This is why these 
central municipal functions are at the crossing of the national and the city 
central sectors…119
The Town Hall, located in this “zone of interface” between city and state, 
was where Doxiadis saw the symbolic origin of Islamabad’s “local” identity. 
It was, in one of his latest schemes, to be a tall building in a modest plaza, a 
visible symbol of civic importance (as well as bureaucracy). Doxiadis called 
for the top of Town Hall to come just below the elevation of the Presidential 
Palace atop the hill,120 placing the two in a kind of dialogue. Brasilia’s monu-
mental axis was lined with ministerial blocks, as a fully integrated component 
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of the city-scale monumental expression of the Capital Complex–the body 
of the bird, the fuselage of the plane, the torso to the head. In Islamabad, 
Doxiadis planned for the two distinct functions of the state and the city to 
work together while remaining distinct. While the entire city of Brasilia–its 
form and symbolism–was of the state, Islamabad was a city hosting the state 
and its symbols.
Doxiadis’s reinforcement of the identity of the city makes sense when one 
considers his global practice as a whole, and I would argue that the dual-
center that Doxiadis proposed is rooted in the cosmopolitan framework of 
his thinking. Dynapolis, as an Ekistics-wide concept about cities, was imple-
mented by Doxiadis wherever possible, and it thereby had little to do with 
the specifics of the symbolic or capital functions of a nation’s capital city. 
Islamabad was not simply a capital-building project for him, in other words; 
it was always tied to something larger, be it the “City of the Future” project 
or his concepts of Dynapolis or Ecumenopolis. In the context of Ecumenop-
olis, the global order of nation-states that was being propagated in Doxiadis’s 
field of the developing world would have been transcended by the global 
interconnection of cities stretching across natural and national boundaries. 
In this way, the nation-state would be considered a phase in a long progres-
sion toward a universal settlement (and an implied post-national condition.) 
While the vision of the Pakistan government was of the city as an entity 
around which to unite a newly derived nationhood, Doxiadis’s priorities lay 
elsewhere–in the preparation for the coming Ecumenopolis–rather than in 
the national priorities of the inescapable present that his “City of the Future” 
happened to be situated within.
3.5 The Central Area Today: A return to City of the State
Islamabad’s Town Hall was never constructed, and neither was Doxiadis’s 
vision for the Capital Complex or the Central Area. Rather, decisions made 
in the process of developing the area conspired to produce an urban system 
that, rather than acknowledging a synergy between municipality and state 
(or any distinction between the two), is dominated by the state’s symbols and 
specifically that of the Presidency. While Stone was developing his design 
work for the CDA, a suggestion was made to shift the central axis of the city 
to the northwest in order to align it with the centerline of Stone’s scheme–
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121 Sten Nilsson implies that the 
shifting of the road was suggest-
ed by Stone in a meeting held in 
July of 1966. However, it seems 
that this issue arose as early as 
April of that year, when Doxiadis 
was asked to respond to criticism 
about the Central Area raised by 
Faruqui. The first such corre-
spondence between Doxiadis 
and the CDA is dated in April of 
1966, three months following the 
termination of Louis Kahn. Doxi-
adis Associates. Considerations 
on Some Questions Related to 
the Development of Islamabad, 
(DOX-PAK-A265), (Athens: Dox-
iadis Associates, April 5, 1966). 
Archive Files 23801. Constanti-
nos A. Doxiadis Archives.
122 The primary concern that the 
CDA, or more specifically 
Faruqui, seems to have had was 
with the axis not being enough of 
a “Monumental Axis.” From the 
correspondence between Doxi-
adis and Faruqui, it is clear that 
the two had different conceptions 
of the term. Doxiadis Associates. 
Considerations on Some Ques-
tions Related to the Develop-
ment of Islamabad, (DOX-PAK-
A265).
123 As Doxiadis mentions in report 
sent to the CDA in response to 
their request to redesign the 
“Civic Center” for the axis that 
they had already decided to 
shift, “One Carriage-way of the 
originally intended alignment 
of Capital Avenue has already 
been constructed.” Doxiadis As-
sociates. Preliminary Design of 
Civic Center, (DOX-PAK-A269). 
(Athens: Doxiadis Associates), 8. 
Archive Files 23801. Constanti-
nos A. Doxiadis Archives.
124 Doxiadis wrote in the report, 
“Doxiadis Associates, although 
believing in the need to respect 
the initial plan which serves the 
city much better, decided that it 
was their duty to take the chal-
lenge that was offered to them 
and make the effort to produce 
a new design concept that would 
that of the Presidential Residence atop the hill.121 The decision to move the 
axis seems to have come out of a discussion within the CDA about their 
impressions of Islamabad’s plan and capital buildings as they were being 
developed, which specifically revolved around the notion of a “Monumental 
Axis,” an idea that had an obvious synergy with the formal presentation, and 
hierarchical implication, of Stone’s proposal.122 Despite Doxiadis’s vigorous 
defense of his original scheme for the Central Area and the unfortunate fact 
that it was already partially complete,123 the axis was indeed shifted to align 
with Stone’s Capital Complex. After proclaiming his discontent with the 
general idea, Doxiadis reluctantly agreed to redesign the Central Area along 
this newly-aligned axis, upon the CDA’s request.124 This revised scheme–
which involved perimeter boulevard buildings inspired by the European 
boulevards–was not realized either.
Today, commercial and retail uses dominate the buildings along Jinnah 
Avenue, and the area has come to be called “Blue Area,” a name which–
incredibly–is derived from the blue “dynamic” Central Area that Doxiadis 
indicated on the original Master Plan.125 The built form of the Central Area 
today stems from a specific master plan that came about after the Capital 
Development Authority deemed Doxiadis’s revised proposal too difficult 
to develop. This plan, generally described, involved the allowance of tall 
towers on the Northwest side of Jinnah Avenue and smaller-scale (5-7 story) 
buildings on the Southeast side, with the conceptual basis for the plan being 
that views of the Margalla Hills would be better preserved by having towers 
at the Northwest side.
What exists in the Blue Area is unfortunate but not surprising. Doxiadis’s 
“Central Area” scheme, which would have undoubtedly required large sums 
of centralized capital and coordination, was not likely to be realized in a 
developing country whose time and resources were spent at war with its 
neighbor and in trying to hold the East and West wings of the country 
together. What was realizable at the time were well-established commer-
cial typologies that either a Pakistani developer could take on (the smaller 
buildings on the southeast side), or that a large foreign investment firm 
would be familiar enough with to buy into (the towers on the northwest 
side.)126 The re-alignment of the axis is a development that worked well with 
Stone’s Mughal symbolism and aesthetic, as well as the government’s enthu-
0 1000 ft
Existing Condition in the FIGURE 51: 
Blue Area
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adapt to the new realities that 
were created for the future of Is-
lamabad as a result of the C.D.A. 
decision and make the most 
out of them.” Doxiadis Associ-
ates. Preliminary Design of Civic 
Center (DOX-PAK-A269), 2.
125 The origin of the term “Blue Area” 
is acknowledged in broad terms 
in various journalistic articles on 
the city. The term also appeared 
on some documents and corre-
spondence authored by Doxiadis 
Associates in the later years of 
the project, which alludes to its 
entrance into a common parlance 
amongst the planning team. See 
Doxiadis Associates. Preliminary 
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siasm for the implications of such, which was amplified in the context of a 
nation that–limping back from a lost war with India–might have been more 
receptive to an approach that engendered as much nationalist symbolism as 
possible in the Capital City. What the Blue Area is not a result of, clearly, is 
Constantinos Doxiadis; and, I would argue, that it is not strictly the product 
of Ayub Khan either, but rather that of opportunistic and well-positioned 
bureaucrats who took the opportunity to make major changes to the face of 
the city, principally the figure of N.A. Faruqui, who pushed for the shifting 
of Jinnah Avenue in favor of a “Monumental Axis” and for the application 
of the “Islamic Touch” to the Capital Complex.
Critiques of Islamabad’s urban form along the lines of power and national 
identity have yielded valuable insights on the city’s post-colonial dilemma, 
and the broad issue of national power as it relates to built form, which I 
acknowledge as critical to the analysis of any capital city. What these ap-
proaches can result in, however, is a conflation of the acts of multiple actors 
in what was clearly a complex and multi-valent effort to construct a city 
from scratch. A critique of Islamabad along these lines is clearly more fruitful 
when it acknowledges the complexity of the evolution of the plan, and its 
changes from conception to reality. No capital project is free from the influ-
ences of the political interests backing it, and one should bear in mind that 
all proposals for Islamabad–from Doxiadis to Kahn to Stone–have included 
major symbolic expressions of nationhood articulated through city form.
In Chandigarh’s project to derive an Indian identity, the buildings provide 
an unquestionably modern one. The same is true for Brasilia. In Islamabad, 
a series of moves conspired to produce a result that reflects not the modern, 
secular democratic ideals of a new country, but rather an ornamented and 
singular expression of power concentrated in the hands of the presidency, in 
dominion over the city.
On Ricoeur’s Paradox–the question of “how to revive an old dormant civili-
zation and take part in universal civilization”127–Chandigarh took a stance; 
Islamabad succumbed to it.
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4. THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION
4.1 The Problem with Imagining Civic Spaces
Some of Doxiadis’s ideas were clearly evolving throughout his career. Toward 
the end of his life, Doxiadis began to modify his argument for Dynapolis, 
and in so doing he modified much of the foundational rationale of Ekistics. 
Through most of his career, he referred to Dynapolis as the “Ideal City of the 
Future”–the built environment that would reflect the new nature of human 
settlements, which had been fundamentally changed by the introduction 
of mechanical technology (i.e. automobiles.) Toward the end of Doxiadis’s 
career, however, as he developed the idea of Entopia, the argument for 
Dynapolis shifted from an argument for an “Ideal City of the Future” to 
that of a “dynamic” transitional state, between the “static” settlements of 
the (pre-industrial) past and the “static” settlements of the future, where 
mankind would return to living in a harmonious and peaceful state.128 
Thus, what Doxiadis was advocating for in Entopia (which he described as 
“between Dystopia and Utopia”) was finding a way to negotiate between the 
traditional city of the pre-industrial past and the realities of an “inevitable” 
modern industrial future. 
Doxiadis often employed a description of his youth in Athens as a way to 
introduce his work:
As a child in Athens I played in a beautiful square filled with tall pines. 
Horse-drawn carriages passed round its edge. When I was 10 the street 
around the square was widened to make room for automobiles. When I was 
20 the last pines were destroyed and the square was reduced to a postage-
stamp size to provide parking space. A statue of a statesman was placed in 
the middle and a bit of space was left for children. When I was 30 the statue 
was carted away to let a highway pass through the middle of the square. 
Now the square is just a parking lot on either side of a wide highway.129
Doxiadis’s entire body of work is colored with the sentiment described in this 
story, one that implied that in the end what human settlements should be is a 
pedestrian-oriented fabric-like built environment, free of cars and full of the 
vibrancy of the collective feeling he recalls of the Athens of his youth. “The 
more we try to clarify our ideas and reach the most basic and essential forms, 
the more we find ourselves reaching back towards tradition.”130 Through 
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his particular brand of urbanism, employed in Islamabad’s sectors, Doxiadis 
implied a certain kind of public sphere that would emerge from such a 
condition. The pedestrian-oriented public sphere that Doxiadis seemed to 
be imagining is not dissimilar to the urban environment that Mumford 
had been nudging CIAM towards, and Sert ended up advocating for in his 
promotion of “Civic Centers.”131 Sert wrote “that the places of public gath-
erings such as public squares, promenades, cafes, popular community clubs, 
etc, where people can meet freely, shake hands, and choose the subject of their 
discussion, are not things of the past and, properly re-planned for the needs 
of today, should have a place in our cities.”132 Implied in Sert’s writing on the 
core is the notion of democracy. In “The Human Scale in City Planning,” he 
advocated boldly and unambiguously for the value of urban cores to demo-
cratic societies. It is important here to remember that, to designers in this 
era, the fragileness of “democracy” had an urgency that is not experienced in 
the West today. Sert’s own personal history (not unlike that of many other 
European Modernists) involved fleeing his native Barcelona on account of 
political ideology. “We must ask ourselves right now,” he wrote, “whom do 
we intend to plan for? In a democracy there can be only one answer: we should 
plan for the people, or the community as a whole.”133
Sert was an academic; Doxiadis was not.134 While Sert took advantage of his 
academic freedom to advocate for larger questions like “democracy” and the 
public sphere, Doxiadis’s globe-trotting professional career involved a less 
dogmatic (at least in appearance) conviction on the relationship of cities to 
such things as democracy, and the fact that he did not always work for stable 
governments fully committed to democratic institutions would have made 
such a public stance problematic. His career was justified more by pragmatics 
than convincing arguments about the social value of the public sphere, and 
he communicated with graphs and abstract diagrams, rather than eloquent 
social rhetoric. Doxiadis’s career was firmly positioned on the U.S./Capital-
ist/Liberal market side of the emerging Cold War equation, which came 
with a certain set of assumptions on the relationship of economic progress 
and “development” to national stability. Thus, notions of liberal capitalism 
and democracy (as opposed to the nearby “threat” of Soviet communism) 
appear in his work more as assumptions than the convictions of an activist.
A key problem with Doxiadis’s work in Ekistics was its overly pre-determined 
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nature. Despite his propensity for thinking across vast scales of time, and 
for anticipating the growth of cities across these time periods, Doxiadis did 
not seem to acknowledge, or significantly incorporate, the notion that a 
city could change over time, that uses and functions would evolve. In the 
case of mechanical technology, he imagined that new modes of transport 
would emerge to replace the car, and he even speculated that rockets and 
helicopters would transport humans across cities and the world.135 Yet, he 
did not speculate in the same way on the built environment of cities, and as 
a result his idea of Dynapolis is strictly an idea of growth–as in the addition 
of physical territory to cities, rather than their ability to change over time–a 
far cry from what the word “dynamic” evokes. Indeed, Doxiadis’s “Central 
Area” for Islamabad, and his concept of “Dynapolis” in general, always 
depicted the “center” with a monolithic and object-like quality. It is the 
most dominant element highlighted on the Master Plan, and the fact that 
its current name of the “Blue Area” is derived from this highlighting of it, 
speaks to an ongoing conception of it as a “special” area of the city. While 
the present-day urban form of the “Blue Area” in Islamabad is not Doxi-
adis’s design, it’s independence within the city is certainly derived from its 
“special” origins. This notion of “specialness” plagued other conceptions of 
the city center as well. CIAM’s “Fifth Function” was generally conceived 
of as an object within the city–the “Civic Center” defined chiefly by the 
uniqueness of programmatic function, and less by the precise nature of its 
relationship to the rest of the city.
4.2 The Rights to the (Capital) City
Islamabad is a short drive from Pakistan.  –local maxim
The above colloquialism has been the reputation of Islamabad nearly since 
its inception. The city, built in a fit of nationalist-laced enthusiasm, which 
aimed to prove to the world the country’s arrival on the world stage and to 
embody the united “hopes and aspirations” of the people, has become the 
city that is viewed more for its distinction from the rest of the nation, and for 
the population of wealthy Western-oriented elite that has consolidated there 
over the years. Aesthetically, Islamabad never resembled the rest of Pakistan, 
and it was never intended to, since it’s conception by all parties was one of 
something completely new. “Islamabad the Beautiful,” as is the CDA slogan, is 
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boasted as Pakistan’s cleanest and greenest city–a city of wide boulevards and 
green spaces, one largely free of slums and in immediate proximity to retreats 
in the Margalla hills. It is no surprise that Islamabad has become an enclave 
for the country’s establishment. Over time, Islamabad’s general pattern has 
been to grow less dense and wealthier, as it continues to spread horizontally 
in a sectoral pattern repeated consistently across the plain. Property values 
have risen steadily since the city was built, and have skyrocketed in recent 
years as the city has grown more and more attractive within a country ex-
periencing internal instability, as well as amongst the Pakistani community 
abroad.
The same wide boulevards, green spaces, and well-ordered built environ-
ment–the principal legacy of Doxiadis’s rationalism–that make it attractive 
to the well-heeled, also lend Islamabad its other reputation as Pakistan’s most 
“boring” city. Islamabad has plenty of commercial centers, but none is con-
sidered a hub of urban life, and an urban sterility is reinforced by the city’s 
horizontality, a condition where getting from one place to another requires a 
vehicle and the deliberate willingness to travel a certain distance. Sectors are 
quite isolated from one another (as planned) and the residences are nearly 
entirely single-family homes–a legacy both of Doxiadis’s contribution and 
the aspirations of a constituency aiming to realize an enlightened and more 
“Western” existence. What the built environment amounts to is a kind of 
automobile-centric urbano-suburbia, a subsidiary only to itself.
Additionally, as Islamabad has grown, the city has developed a deliberately 
non-porous perimeter. Security checkpoints monitor traffic entering the 
city, principally out of a concern for domestic terrorism. There is another, 
more aesthetic, form of restriction going on in Islamabad as well. The type 
of buses which serve as a primary mode of transit for Pakistanis throughout 
the country are banned from the city, ostensibly for environmental reasons. 
Only minivans and modern bus lines are allowed in. The same goes for 
animal-drawn vehicles (tongas), and trucks delivering construction material, 
that are banned from the city during the daytime. Allowing any of these 
elements into the city, it is thought, will disrupt the pristine environment 
of Islamabad, and violate its primary purpose as the façade of a well-run 
city (and thereby country). Through these security and aesthetic moves, 
Islamabad has become a well-fortified and distinct island within Pakistan.
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That Islamabad is an island is ironic in two ways. Firstly, it is a reflection of the 
“Pakistan-as-fortress” mentality that has dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy 
and governmental psyche in the decades since Ayub. Putting its primary 
attention and resources toward the “threat” of its immediate neighbors has 
led to the deterioration of Pakistan’s infrastructure and a national leader-
ship alienated from its people. The gradual “enclaving” of Islamabad over 
the years is a tangible reflection of this neglect and isolation. Secondly, 
Islamabad-as-island is especially ironic given its proximity to the City of 
Rawalpindi. Islamabad’s original Master Plan conceptualized Islamabad 
and Rawalpindi as a “double-Dynapolis”–twin-cities growing side-by-side 
together. Doxiadis argued early on that the proximity of Islamabad’s site to 
Rawalpindi would be a great asset to establishing the city. Rawalpindi was to 
serve as a “foster parent” to Islamabad, providing access to its labor market, 
goods and services, and infrastructure,136 making the Capital city enterprise 
more efficient. Islamabad, it was believed, would grow to become the more 
dominant city, with Rawalpindi ultimately as its subsidiary. Today, 50 years 
after Islamabad’s conception, Rawalpindi is still the more populous of the 
two cities, as well as the denser one. It is where the region’s bus and train 
hubs are located, as well as the capital city’s current airport.137 Rawalpindi 
also provides Islamabad with much of its labor force. Precise data is not 
available to this author, but anecdotal evidence suggests that upwards of 
50% of Islamabad’s workforce commutes from Rawalpindi, primarily for 
lower-wage employment.
Bustling and crowded, Rawalpindi is a city of approximately 3.0 million,138 
one of a character and nature much more similar to the typical South 
Asian urban condition than Islamabad will ever be. The plan for side-by-
side “dynamic” growth to the southwest did not occur as planned. While 
Islamabad has largely stuck to its plan, as it is proceeding (almost blindly, 
one could argue) with its pre-determined course of expanding along the 
“dynamic” axis to the southwest. Rawalpindi, however, has nearly done 
the opposite. Rawalpindi has densified on its northern edge, growing up 
to its city limits, a growth pattern that makes absolute sense given its sub-
sidiary relationship to the city, and resembles a border condition akin to 
that between the United States and Mexico, rather than an integrated or 
cooperative “twin-city” system. In this way, Islamabad is still the minor yet 
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dominant city, akin to that of a colonial cantonment–wealthy, powerful, and 
occupying an area peripheral to the “real” Pakistani city just next door.
Ayub’s vision was to unite a diverse population around a new state of 
Pakistan, and to represent it through built form. The singularity of that idea 
overtook other conceptions of the city, and Islamabad is now a national 
capital dominated by state symbols. Socially, Islamabad has both an elitist 
reputation and outlook, a far cry from a city meant to represent the “hopes 
and aspiration” of a nation’s people. Perhaps what Islamabad needs most is 
to let the rest of the country in; perhaps what Pakistan needs is a capital city 
that embraces the nation.
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5. PROJECTING A CITY
 FOR ALL PEOPLE OF THE NATION
Today, Islamabad is an isolated city. It is seen as foreign, privileged, and 
principally as the symbol of a state which is 1) too influenced by foreign 
powers (a sentiment amplified by the city’s western suburban character), 
and 2) deficient in servicing its populace. The following proposition begins 
with the notion that the present deficiency of the state is no reason not to 
speculate on a future. I further argue that re-considering the condition of 
the capital city, and its fundamental identity, could go hand-in-glove with 
broad reforms nation-wide. The goal of this proposition is to establish a 
framework for a city of Islamabad that can speak to a 21st Century Pakistan. 
The bulk of the proposition involves specific Urban Design strategies for 
the re-conceptualization of the physical territory of Islamabad’s central axis. 
Following those strategies are a series of recommendations that relate to this 
re-conceptualized center, and to the city as a whole; these relate more to 
policy than to built-form.
Doxiadis had a unique proposition: that the city of Islamabad, capital city 
or not, needed to have civic functions, and a civic expression independent 
of the state. He was wise to foresee that a municipality could move beyond 
strictly representing the nation-state, a proposition that represents a positive 
aspect to his propensity for long-term thinking. On the other hand, his 
belief that the world’s people would soon be united by cosmopolitan institu-
tions and, eventually, the built form of Ecumenopolis was rather naïve. Nev-
ertheless, I share with Doxiadis a belief that he seems to have held, which is 
that the city is a part of something much larger, and that the people in the 
city of the nation deserve something better from their Capital City.
The following proposition takes as its territory the area immediately in front 
of the Capital Complex–an area that is largely closed off today, and only 
host to civic protests and once-yearly national parades–as well as the section 
of the axis between Islamabad’s first four sectors of F6, G6, F7, and G7–the 
area known today as “Blue Area.” Implicit in my confining the study area to 
this zone is a commitment to restricting the further growth of Islamabad’s 
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Blue Area along the axis, for the foreseeable future. At present, large areas 
within the Blue Area are vacant land that has not been developed at all in 
Islamabad’s 50 year history. Much of the following proposition focuses on 
these vacant areas. To extend Blue Area to the southwest along the axis in the 
face of all this vacant territory seems misdirected.139 Focusing on the Blue 
Area as a distinct and unique central element in the city will lend hierarchy 
to Islamabad as a whole, and such an effort should go hand in glove with 
policies put in place by the city to deliberately plan for and implement such 
a concentration.
The following proposition is arranged around three Urban Design strategies: 
Accessibility, Connectivity, and Collectivity. Within the strategy of Col-
lectivity is an Urban Design proposition for the foreground of Islamabad’s 
Capital Complex. Each strategy is undertaken in an effort to lend cohesion 
to the Central Area as an element within the city, and to address practical 
dysfunctions. They are also designed, admittedly, to subvert the overt na-
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tionalism of the axis, and to claim the Central Area as a territory for civic 
expression that is more voluntary and benign, and not necessarily tied up in 
the issues of the state–either in the protest against it or the support of it.
5.1 Accessibility
The strategy of Accessibility attempts to address the relationship that 
Islamabad has to its surroundings, and to begin to address Islamabad’s rep-
utation as being “a short drive from Pakistan,” as the colloquialism goes. 
The city feels like a foreign, “western”, hyper-rational city, one not at all 
characteristic of a more typical South Asian urban experience. To a certain 
extent this will always characterize Islamabad; it was, after all, designed by 
everyone involved to be something new, and its residents do enjoy their ex-
clusivity. Yet, accessibility to the capital is fundamentally important for both 
the country at large and one’s experience in what is now widely nicknamed 
Pakistan’s most “boring” city. Islamabad’s aura of a colonial cantonment is 
highlighted by its immediate proximity to the dynamic and bustling city of 
Rawalpindi on its southern boundary–which has three times Islamabad’s 
population squeezed into a smaller area. In order to embrace the rest of the 
country, or at least Rawalpindi to start with, any re-configuration of Islam-
abad’s central area needs to incorporate a transit system that both connects 
to the periphery in a deliberate way and reinforces the central area as an 
urban element.
Thus, the proposition suggests two approaches. The first is to place a regional 
bus terminal at the southwestern end of the Blue Area. Presently, the region’s 
central bus terminal is located in Rawalpindi. The terminal in this proposal 
is intended to serve two types of needs–one being a hub for shuttles that 
would transport travelers from Islamabad to the Rawalpindi station, and the 
other being a hub for a small group of private bus lines that have begun to 
connect Islamabad itself to destinations such as Lahore.  Currently these bus 
lines operate from different stations outside of the Blue Area. The second 
approach with respect to accessibility relates to transit within the city itself. 
There already exist a good number of intra-city transit routes served by 
private minibus lines (formerly large buses). These lines would naturally 
remain, and they would be augmented by the addition of a transit loop that 
would operate from one end of the axis to the other. Rather than moving 
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along the main axial street of Jinnah Avenue, this loop line would travel 
along the streets closer to the edge of the residential sectors. This would 
de-emphasize the axial street and, over time, encourage development that 
relates just as much to the residential sectors as with Jinnah Avenue. Stops 
along the transit route would be located at the development concentrations 
called out in the “Collectivity” strategy, as well as the crossings called for in 
the “Connectivity” strategy.
5.2 Connectivity
The strategy of Connectivity relates closely to Accessibility, in that it is 
meant to address the flow of individuals and traffic to the Blue Area. This 
strategy specifically addresses the connections to the adjacent sectors, which 
are currently very isolated from each other. Their isolation is a direct result 
of the kind of circuit-city functionalism present in Doxiadis’s master plan, 
which called for the sectors to be “human sectors” separated by vehicular 
highways, and as such the connectivity between them was limited. Often, 
the 2,000 yard sides of the sectors only have one vehicular access point into 
the sector. In the Blue Area, where–despite the physical proximity of the 
residential areas to the buildings of the Blue Area–the street pattern makes 
for an extremely cumbersome routing of traffic.
The street pattern in the Blue Area as a whole reinforces the linearity of the 
axis. In the approximately four-kilometer length of the Blue Area, there is 
only one crossing from the north side to the south side, outside of the grade-
separated interchanges between the sectors. By contrast, in the approximate-
ly 1,300 foot transect of the axis–stretching between the outer edges of the 
sectors–there are at least 22 lanes of traffic moving parallel to the axis. The 
“Connectivity” strategy aims to address this radical imbalance in two ways.
Firstly, improvements can be made in both connecting vehicular streets from 
the residential sectors to the buildings of the Blue Area and, where feasible, 
across Jinnah Avenue. Wherever a residential street comes to the edge of the 
sector, the recommendation is to extend it at least as far at the buildings of 
Blue Area. This would be especially beneficial on the north side of Sector 
G7, where incredibly there is no vehicular connection from the sector edge 
to the buildings of Blue Area. Some streets can easily be connected across 
Jinnah Avenue, the most obvious opportunity being the extension of Marvi 
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Road from F7 across Jinnah Avenue to Jasmin Road in G7. However, the 
recommendation would be to not employ the strategy that was used between 
F6 and G6, which incorporated a grade-separated interchange. While this 
strategy would certainly increase the speed of vehicular connectivity between 
sectors, it would do little to enhance the experience along the axis itself. The 
investment in such a project, additionally, is likely better spent elsewhere. 
Currently, the proliferation of traffic lanes moving parallel to Jinnah Avenue 
seems quite redundant. To address this redundancy, this scheme proposes to 
eliminate Fazal-e-Haq Road, the dual-carriage boulevard on the south side of 
Jinnah Avenue. Currently, this road is heavily travelled, principally because 
it has good access to Blue Area. Over time, as the primary axis of Jinnah 
Avenue is more perforated with cross-streets, Fazal-e-Haq will become less 
important and its removal will seem more feasible. Its elimination would not 
only provide for a more efficient allocation of traffic capacity moving parallel 
to Jinnah Avenue, but in its combination with the lateral extensions of resi-
dential streets through to Jinnah Avenue, it would allow a significant area of 
the city, between Blue Area and G7, to be opened up for development. In 
this scenario, the service road on the south side of the Blue Area buildings 
of G6 and G7 could become an urban street with buildings on each side, as 
opposed to the asymmetry it has now. One could perceive of the develop-
ment of this area as providing the financial backing for the significant modi-
fications to the vehicular streets that this proposal recommends.  
The second means of increasing connectivity across Jinnah Avenue is to 
reconnect an existing network of nallahs, or streams, in the city, which are 
currently culverted within the transect of the axis. These are an intrigu-
ing element of Doxiadis’s master plan, a part of his effort to integrate the 
natural landscape and urban environment. The proposition is to daylight 
them, and use them as a means to collect pedestrian and two-wheeler traffic. 
The locations where these nallahs cross the axis transect make for good op-
portunities to concentrate the development proposed in the “Collectivity” 
strategy. As with the other strategies, this one also attempts to serve two 
purposes: to address a dysfunction in the city (the fact that traffic between 
sectors is disrupted by the axis), as well as to challenge the linearity of Jinnah 
Avenue, which embodies the nationalist dominance of the axis. The nallahs 
and the plantings along them would interrupt the hypnotic view of the 
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Capital Complex at regular intervals, such that–in perspective–as one moves 
along the axis the Presidency on the horizon rises and sinks with respect to 
the planted foreground.
5.3 Collectivity
Within the strategy of collectivity, I am proposing to distribute concentra-
tions of new urban development along the axis, which would include civic 
programs that are public in nature. These concentrations would be located 
where the nallahs cross the axis transect, and also co-located with stops on the 
transit loop. At this point, the intention of these “concentrations” is merely 
that they be comprised of civic programs, urban open spaces, and housing. 
Housing has a certain relevance to the contemporary needs in the city,140 
and it would be a good opportunity to provide a mixture of programs in this 
area of the city. Incidentally, Doxiadis’s plans for the Central Area included 
up to 6,000 units of housing, making it unique from the vast majority of 
the other “Fifth Function” Civic Centers that were being proposed at the 
time. Regarding the precise civic programs to be located along the axis, it 
140 Housing prices in Islamabad are 
high, and thereby the provision 
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seems too early to make such recommendations, but they could include 
programs such as museums, libraries, theaters, etc which could be either 
municipal or national in scope. Locating civic programs of national scope–
such as a national library, etc–would be an opportunity to expose visitors to 
the national capital to the potential for a positive patrimony of a national 
government. This is out of an effort to stretch the presence of “Pakistan” 
from that of a state expression at the end of the axis to that of a nation.
5.4 The Civic Foreground
Concentrated at the end of the axis, immediately in front of the Capital 
Complex, is what I am terming Islamabad’s “New Civic Foreground.” In 
the area where the Lawyers Movement protest from this thesis’s introduc-
tion was staged–the place which is now largely empty, and only used for 
the necessary function of challenging the government or for witnessing an 
organized national spectacle of a parade, is here filled with productive civic 
uses in the foreground of national spectacle. The proposal is for a large park 
to replace the entire space–a park which collects arts, educational, and rec-
reational uses. The major elements in the Civic Foreground are (as indicated 
in red) a Central Library for Islamabad, an outdoor performance pavilion 
adjacent to the existing National Art Gallery, and a transit station for the 
loop line. Recreational fields comprise the majority of the park, with cricket 
pitches being a central component. A sizeable section of the only existing 
built element in the area–the grandstand put in place for national parades–is 
re-incorporated as a viewing platform for sports matches. Parades, inciden-
tally, could still very well proceed through the park, although the option 
of having a national parade circumambulate a civic park is an even more 
intriguing possibility.
Embedded in this proposition is an idea that the city–capital or not–re-
quires a civic function. This proposition embraces the notion that there is 
something subversive, as well as productive and poetic, about playing cricket 
in front of your national capitol, which says something more about the 
country–something that speaks more to pluralism and complexity in the 
country–than what we find there today.
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The Civic ForegroundFIGURE 61: 
107
Perspective  FIGURE 62: 
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5.5 Broader Recommendations
Restructuring of the Capital Development Authority. This thesis cannot 
speak with tremendous authority on the issue of municipal governance in 
Islamabad, since the subject has simply not been its focus. However, in 
general terms, certain things are clear. As the government institution es-
tablished to build the City of Islamabad, the CDA does not seem to have 
moved beyond the practice of producing Islamabad to projecting and main-
taining Islamabad. The mode of the CDA still very much resembles that 
of a property developer, selling parcels of land, overseeing projects within 
the city, and expanding the city further into the periphery. Yet, the CDA 
does deliver municipal services to the population (and manages tax resources 
from citizens), and its leadership organ has taken on the persona of a city 
council. The CDA is mired in a vast transitional field between developer and 
government body. Islamabad, by extension, is somewhere between Project and 
City. In this middle ground is where the city’s future potential, and specifi-
cally the future of the city’s center, is harbored.
The roots of this condition, to my mind, are in the city’s governance 
structure. The CDA is still, as it was when it was formed in June of 1960, 
a body appointed by–and answerable to–the Pakistan national government. 
This direct link to the state is understandable given Islamabad’s capital city 
function, and certainly made sense in the context of the capital’s establish-
ment; yet, it has two detrimental impacts on the city today. Firstly, having 
the CDA as a non-elected body places an unproductive distance between the 
governance of the city and its residents. Despite the government’s founding 
notion of Islamabad being simply an administrative capital, the city today 
has well-established business interests and a population that largely relates 
to the administrative functions in only an indirect way, if at all. Thus, the 
city has outgrown its founding intention. Moreover, such a direct connec-
tion to the state automatically telegraphs difficulties at the state level to that 
of the city. This makes Islamabad susceptible to the whims of bureaucrats 
appointed by weak and constantly shifting political figures. The lack of ac-
countability by the city government to its residents engenders the city with 
a broad sense of disconnection, and could keep both parties from investing 
productively in the city’s future. Even despite this disconnection, however, 
community groups within the city have successfully lobbied the CDA on 
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141 The “Local Government Or-
dinance” was implemented in 
2001, distributing a finer grain of 
elected bodies in Pakistan. See 
“Local Governance” at http://
www.decentralization.org.pk/
lg.asp, accessed May 20, 2009.
issues such as transportation and green space; under a more accountable 
system of governance, this type of engagement could flourish. Secondly, the 
CDA’s oversight by the state government amplifies nationalist expression in 
the city, rather than recognizing any balance between the needs of the city 
(whose population, once again, has moved beyond a uni-dimensional defini-
tion as an administrative city) and its state functions.
A re-structuring of the CDA to incorporate a directly-elected government 
body would not only make it accountable to the residents of the city, but 
would bring Islamabad in line with all other municipalities in Pakistan which 
have had direct elections of local councils since at least 2001.141 Changing 
the leadership structure at the CDA would be a significant step in guiding 
Islamabad from Project to City.
Dismantling of the City’s Perimeter. The accessibility of the city is of 
paramount importance to Islamabad’s future. What is critically important 
to Islamabad, and its reputation as being “a short drive from Pakistan,” is 
the free access of the ordinary Pakistani citizen to their Capital City. While 
Rawalpindi is bursting at the seams, Islamabad has constructed a virtual 
wall in the form of implicit and explicit rules that exclude certain types 
of vehicles, specifically those associated with the lower-income population–
horse- and ox-drawn carts, buses, and construction vehicles during daytime 
hours. Security requirements are real, and will likely be necessary for some 
time. Yet, these other practices of aesthetic policing only heighten Islam-
abad’s exclusivity, and yield little beyond the maintenance of an aesthetic 
illusion of the city as an enlightened exclusive entity. Creating civic desti-
nations such as those described above will combat this issue from another 
angle, by drawing people to the city.
Blue Area Overlay District. Islamabad’s zoning laws focus primarily on the 
Residential sectors of the city. The Blue Area at this time is subject to the 
Master Plan that brought about the asymmetrical layout of high-rise towers 
on the north side of Jinnah Avenue and the lower buildings on the south 
side. As is evident from the existing condition, the area on the north side of 
the boulevard has developed at a much slower pace than that on the south 
side. Over half of the available area on that side is un-built, while the south 
side is nearly fully built. This proposition contends that the zoning of the 
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Blue Area needs to be readdressed in order to lend the area a distinction 
within the city. The best means toward that end could be the creation of 
what could be called a “zoning overlay” which would give special consider-
ation to the projects happening within the Blue Area, and relate them to a 
plan for the wider area based on the strategies described above. This would 
be necessary for approaching implementation.
The Capital Complex as Remnant. That Islamabad is the capital city is not 
an incidental fact. It does little good to lament the “third class” buildings of 
the Capital Complex. The buildings are what they are–symbols of a national 
power structure. It is difficult to imagine a near-term scenario which would 
allow an opening up of the Complex to the general public–both for security 
concerns and the fact that the political structure has much more important 
issues to deal with. In the long-term I believe there is some sense to the 
notion of bringing the public closer to the center of power. The buildings 
exist as monuments in the city and their uses could easily be re-interpreted 
and even re-programmed, especially as Pakistan develops a more democratic 
profile of government. In the meantime, the re-formalization of their fore-
ground offers an opportunity for the type an interface between a people 
and their government that is confrontational only at times necessary, and 
productively communal at all others.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have tried to avoid significant attention to or speculation on 
the contemporary condition of Pakistan. Even so, in this conclusion I would 
like to return briefly to the national landscape alluded to in the Introduc-
tion. Slowly the State of Pakistan is coming around to the idea–an idea that 
has been well-known by the nation’s people for some time–that the “fortress” 
it has constructed to protect itself from hostile neighbors has been well 
outgrown. Pakistan’s overly militarized leadership and elements of religious 
fundamentalism are not simply frustrations to the national psyche, but 
deeply problematic issues for the nation’s present and future. As this thesis 
is being written, the Pakistan Army has launched a major offensive against 
religious fundamentalists in the Northwest Frontier Province, following 
months and years of placation and attempts at negotiation. Few believe that 
Pakistan will succumb to such insurgencies; there is indeed enough national 
unity, and plenty of military support, to prevent that from happening. Even 
so, it remains to be seen to what degree this recent manifestation of Paki-
stan’s “crisis” will lead to significant change in the country’s governance.142
The late Pakistani writer and public intellectual, Eqbal Ahmed, writing in 
the 1980s when Islamization in Pakistan was on the rise, wrote about a 
“crisis” in Islam and governance in the following way:
When a civilization reaches a point of fundamental crisis and perceptible 
decline, we see three responses: restorationist, reconstructionist, and prag-
matist… The restorationist is one that seeks the restoration of the past in 
its idealized form. This is the thrust of fundamentalism… The reconstruc-
tionist is one that seeks to blend tradition with modernity in an effort to 
reform society… The pragmatist denotes an attitude of viewing religious 
requirements as being largely unrelated to the direct concerns of states and 
governments and of dealing with affairs of state in terms of the political and 
economic imperatives of contemporary life. The regulation of religious life is 
left to civil society and to private institutions.143
Eqbal Ahmed goes on to posit that “The often publicized ideological resur-
gence of Islam… is a product of excessive and uneven moderisation and the 
failure of governments to safeguard national sovereignty or to satisfy basic 
needs.” His observations are incredibly salient in light of Pakistan’s contem-
porary condition, despite their being over two decades old. The struggle that 
142 Scholars of Pakistan, largely 
from the West, often write of the 
country as being in a perpetual 
condition of “crisis,” and Paki-
stan is frequently portrayed as 
moments from “failure.” It is un-
deniable that Pakistan is facing 
a national crisis, but I am more 
interested in the systemic origins 
of that “crisis” – failures of in-
frastructure and an unresolved 
debate on religion and gover-
nance – than on questions of 
domestic terrorism or authoritar-
ian rule specifically in isolation. 
See Manam Ahmed, “Legends of 
the Fail,” in The National news-
paper in the UAE: http://www.
thenational.ae/article/20090508/
REVIEW/705079996/1008
143 Eqbal Ahmed, “Islam and Poli-
tics”, in Islam, Politics and the 
State: The Pakistan Experi-
ence, Mohammed Asghar Khan, 
Ed. (London: Zed Books, 1985), 
p26.
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Pakistan faces today, he reminds us, is not an old one at all. The Muslim 
League faced the very same issue at Partition. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was of 
Eqbal Ahmed’s second school–the reconstructionist leader seeking to form 
a modern “Islamic Democracy.” Jinnah’s secular side won the debate on the 
eve of Partition, but it is one that still lingers in the present day. The key to 
addressing the “crisis” in Pakistan, Ahmed stresses, is in addressing infra-
structure and services and–most importantly–access to them.
What Pakistan’s present-day experience with extremists at its periphery does 
is push the debate of Pakistan’s “Islamic Democracy” into the open. The 
extremists are driven by an ideology of the past–the restorationist of Eqbal 
Ahmed’s model. Pakistan’s Lawyer’s Movement is a contemporary manifesta-
tion of Jinnah’s mold; they hold a strong belief in the “rule of law” and the 
Constitution, and a general conviction to defend those over any political 
or religious ideology. Pakistan’s yet emerging civil society is showing signs 
of strength. If it were to continue pushing Pakistan toward a more stable, 
democratic condition, there is a role–perhaps a necessity–for the capital city 
to imbue such a change in profile. It is my contention that a time of “crisis” 
is precisely the time to make bold propositions–provocations that speak to 
how a society should be, and to what its public realm should be like. Urban 
Design, as the practice of advocating for the public realm, is precisely the 
discipline within which to make such provocations.
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